- Al-Qaeda enters the 25th anniversary of 9/11 transformed rather than defeated. Its central leadership is greatly weakened, but a decentralized network of affiliates has embedded itself in conflicts from the Sahel and Somalia to Yemen and Afghanistan. - Especially in Africa, JNIM and al-Shabaab demonstrate how the movement has shifted from spectacular international terrorism toward patient insurgency, territorial influence, taxation, and shadow governance, even as its ability to conduct large-scale attacks in the West has declined. Elsewhere: - Houthi advances toward Bab el-Mandeb and missile attacks on Saudi Arabia threaten Riyadh’s Red Sea alternative to the disrupted Strait of Hormuz while testing the new Saudi-Turkish-Pakistani Mecca defense pact. - Iran’s renewed construction at Pickaxe Mountain risks triggering further U.S. strikes, while Washington is expanding financial pressure on Iranian proxy networks. The Middle East energy shock is meanwhile feeding European inflation and tighter monetary policy. - Beyond the Middle East region, India’s BRICS summit will test its balancing between China, Russia, Iran, and the West. - Bosnia-Serbia tensions are again internationalizing. |
Center of Gravity
What you need to know
Al-Qaeda at 25: Weaker core, stronger network
Twenty-five years after 9/11, al-Qaeda has failed at every stated goal: no U.S. withdrawal from the Middle East, no collapsed alliances, no global caliphate. Osama bin Laden is dead, so is his successor Ayman al-Zawahiri, and the group's original Afghan sanctuary is gone.
But the network bin Laden built has outlived the organization he ran. Some affiliates now field thousands of fighters, tax civilians, and control territory more effectively than al-Qaeda's central leadership ever did.
The core shrank. The franchise grew.
From command post to holding company
The pre-9/11 al-Qaeda was centralized: Bin Laden's inner circle picked targets, moved money, and ran training camps. That model is gone.
Current leader Saif al-Adel, an Egyptian long based in Iran, is widely seen as al-Qaeda's de facto chief, though the United Nations says his actual authority remains unclear. U.N. assessments describe the central leadership as marginalized, with limited ability to direct attacks abroad. Affiliates now raise their own money, pick their own fights, and adapt ideology to local politics.
Africa is the new front line
The Sahel coalition JNIM (Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin) is al-Qaeda's strongest theater. It has expanded across Mali and Burkina Faso and is pushing into Niger and coastal West Africa.
JNIM's fighting strength is estimated at 7,000-8,000, per recent U.N.-linked reporting.
The group has blockaded roads and fuel routes around Bamako, pressuring Mali's capital directly, a tactic beyond simple terrorism.
A roughly $50 million ransom from a late-2025 Mali kidnapping reportedly helped fund JNIM's expansion and circulated through the wider al-Qaeda network, per U.N. investigators.
In Somalia, al-Shabaab has survived nearly two decades of Somali, African Union, and U.S. pressure. It taxes territory, runs intelligence networks, and still threatens Mogadishu, functioning as insurgency, shadow government, and criminal economy at once.
Yemen and Afghanistan: latent risk, not restored base
Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) is weaker than its peak during Yemen's civil war but is regaining financial strength through smuggling, extortion, and maritime crime between Yemen and the Horn of Africa. It remains the affiliate historically most interested in hitting Western targets.
Afghanistan under the Taliban is a permissive environment, and Zawahiri's 2022 death in Kabul proved old ties endure. But the large training-camp infrastructure of the 1990s hasn't reappeared publicly; the most active current threats from Afghan soil come from the Pakistani Taliban and ISIS-Khorasan, not al-Qaeda directly.
Patience beat spectacle
Islamic State's post-2013 rise, with its caliphate and mass foreign-fighter recruitment, briefly eclipsed al-Qaeda. But ISIS's visibility made it a target for systematic destruction. Al-Qaeda's affiliates instead embedded in local insurgencies and avoided provoking major intervention, a slower model that proved more durable.
Western homelands are safer, but intent hasn't faded
No attack has come close to matching 9/11's scale, thanks to intelligence sharing, financial tracking, and leadership strikes that make centrally directed, multi-operative plots far harder to organize. The U.N. says al-Qaeda still wants external attacks and its propaganda still pushes self-initiated violence, even as centralized capability has eroded. Small-scale or inspired attacks remain the more realistic threat.
The scenario to watch
The likelier danger isn't a repeat of 9/11, but the emergence of jihadist-controlled zones inside failing states.
If JNIM keeps expanding while Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger stay politically unstable and militarily stretched, al-Qaeda could gain a large, contiguous zone of influence built through its own insurgency rather than a host government's protection.
Somalia is a second candidate if al-Shabaab outlasts another round of international military support.
Territorial control of that kind would generate money, recruits, and training ground, potentially reviving the external-operations capability the network has largely lost since 2001.
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Al-Qaeda revives bin Laden name in new propaganda
Al-Qaeda's media arm, As-Sahab, has released previously unseen footage of Hamza bin Laden, son of Osama bin Laden. The release is fueling speculation about his fate and about the group's messaging strategy, but it offers no proof he's alive.
The footage appears archival, not newly recorded, and contains no verifiable reference to events after 2019. The U.S. announced that year that Hamza bin Laden had been killed in a counterterrorism operation in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region. No authenticated video or audio has surfaced from him since.
Why it matters
Al-Qaeda is deliberately putting the bin Laden name and image back into circulation. That choice likely serves one of three purposes: reinforcing ties to the group's founding generation, shoring up ideological cohesion across a decentralized network, or sowing deliberate ambiguity about Hamza bin Laden's fate.
Unverified claims that Hamza survived the 2019 operation and later resurfaced in Afghanistan have circulated for years. Absent footage with a clear, contemporary reference point, this release should be read as a propaganda move, not evidence he's alive.
Known Unknowns: The impact of U.S. tariffs on international trade & especially the U.S. bond market. Whether protagonists in the U.S./Israel war on Iran will return to genuine peace negotiations, and the military capabilities & staying power of both sides. What impact the Iran war will have on the global economy. Relations of new Syrian government with Israel, international community, & ability to maintain & expand stability and control inside Syria. China’s triggers for military action against Taiwan. U.S. and allied responses to China’s ‘grey zone’ warfare in the South China Sea and north Asia. Ukraine’s ability to withstand Russia’s war of attrition. The potential for the jihadist insurgency in Africa’s Sahel region to consolidate and spread.
Cold War 2.0
It’s the U.S. vs China, everyone needs to pick a side
BRICS summit tests India's balancing act
The BRICS summit in New Delhi brings together leaders whose countries are reshaping the global order, but whose interests increasingly diverge. Russian President Vladimir Putin, Chinese President Xi Jinping, and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian are expected to join Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and other bloc leaders.
Members share an interest in diluting Western dominance, but the wars involving Iran and Ukraine are likely to expose real splits over security and foreign policy within the group.
India is caught in the middle
New Delhi is trying to hold three relationships at once: longstanding ties with Russia, deepening links with Iran, and closer strategic and economic cooperation with the U.S. and Europe, all while working to improve relations with China. The summit is a direct test of whether India's "strategic autonomy" policy can survive sharpening geopolitical divisions.
A Modi-Xi thaw, not the communique, is the real story
Xi's expected trip would be his first to India in seven years, marking another step in the gradual Sino-Indian thaw since deadly clashes on their disputed Himalayan border. Relations remain cautious, weighed down by strategic suspicion, economic restrictions, and unresolved border disputes.
A substantive Modi-Xi meeting could matter more than the summit's formal communique, especially if it yields concrete steps toward normalizing political or economic ties.
For India, even a modest China thaw could ease pressure on its northern frontier and free up diplomatic bandwidth elsewhere.
For Beijing, stabilizing ties with New Delhi helps slow India's drift toward the U.S. and its Indo-Pacific partners.
The bigger question for the bloc
The summit will show whether BRICS is becoming a more coherent geopolitical bloc or remains a loose forum for members pursuing separate, sometimes conflicting, national interests.
The Middle East
Birthplace of civilization
Houthis push toward Bab el-Mandeb, threatening Saudi oil route
Yemen's Houthis have sharply widened their campaign against Saudi Arabia, pairing a ground offensive along the Red Sea coast with sustained missile and drone strikes on Saudi energy and military sites. The combination threatens one of the world's key alternative oil-export corridors.
Mocha falls, Bab el-Mandeb is next
Houthi forces captured the Red Sea port of Mocha on September 10 and have pushed south toward Dhubab and the approaches to Bab el-Mandeb, with fighting also underway on strategic islands near the strait. Consolidating these positions would significantly boost the Houthis' ability to threaten shipping transiting between the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden.
Saudi Arabia has responded with airstrikes and stepped-up support for Yemeni government forces, and is reportedly seeking greater U.S. military assistance amid concern that Mocha's fall could reshape the balance of power around the strait.
Missile campaign hits Saudi infrastructure directly
Starting September 8, the Houthis launched coordinated ballistic-missile and drone strikes on targets around Jizan, Abha, Najran, and Khamis Mushait, with further attacks on September 9.
Saudi authorities reported dozens of injuries and damage to energy and other infrastructure.
The Houthis have previously claimed attacks on facilities tied to the East-West Pipeline, which moves crude from Saudi Arabia's eastern oilfields to the Red Sea port of Yanbu.
No firm evidence the main pipeline has been seriously damaged; continued high crude loadings at Yanbu indicate the system is still operational.
Saudi Arabia's Hormuz workaround is now under threat too
The East-West Pipeline and Yanbu export route have taken on outsized strategic weight because of separate disruption to shipping through the Strait of Hormuz. Saudi Arabia can move oil west to bypass Hormuz, but tankers loading at Yanbu still must transit the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb, the same waters the Houthis are now advancing toward.
That leaves Saudi Arabia's primary alternative export corridor exposed at both ends: missiles and drones can hit pipelines, pumping stations, and refineries inside the kingdom, while the ground advance threatens tankers once they enter the Red Sea. The Houthis say their maritime campaign targets Saudi shipping specifically, but past strikes show they've struggled to reliably distinguish vessels, a track record that could raise insurance costs and deter shippers regardless of stated intent.
A two-strait crisis in the making
The offensive increasingly reads as part of the broader Iran-U.S. regional confrontation: Iran can pressure traffic through Hormuz while the Houthis pressure Saudi Arabia's Red Sea workaround. Simultaneous disruption of both waterways would carry substantial consequences for global oil supply and shipping costs.
Watch whether the Houthis consolidate Mocha, take Dhubab, and secure nearby islands.
Watch for the start of sustained attacks on Saudi-linked shipping.
Further strikes on Jizan, Yanbu, or East-West Pipeline infrastructure would mark another major escalation.
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Mecca Accords face their first real test
Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan signed the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement on August 7, 2026, a NATO-style collective defense pact under which an attack on one signatory is treated as an attack on all.
A meeting in Turkey later created formal institutions, including a permanent secretariat based in Saudi Arabia, with a mechanism for other countries to join reportedly already underway.
Houthi strikes are the pact's first trigger
The Houthis' September 8-9 missile and drone strikes on Abha, Khamis Mushait, Jazan, and Najran, which wounded at least 73 people and forced a temporary shutdown at a Saudi Aramco facility in Jazan, mark the first serious challenge to the alliance's collective-defense clause. Pakistan's government has sent mixed signals.
Defense Minister Khawaja Asif said an attack on Saudi Arabia, or Houthi spillover from Yemen, could activate the pact, per Bloomberg.
Days later, a Pakistani foreign ministry spokesperson said no military response was under discussion, adding Islamabad would "act when the time comes."
Turkey's foreign ministry condemned the Houthi strikes and reaffirmed support for Saudi Arabia but has stopped short of military commitment.
Turkey and Pakistan are hedging, not mobilizing
Both governments remain wary of direct confrontation with Iran, the Houthis' backer. Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan has said the nature of any assistance depends on the specific crisis and an explicit request from the attacked nation, a qualification that rules out automatic troop deployment and points Ankara's contribution toward drones, radar, and surveillance technology instead.
The alliance's credibility, not its firepower, is what's being tested. Continued Houthi attacks could push Turkey and Pakistan toward deeper security involvement alongside Saudi Arabia, widening the circle of states with a direct stake in the kingdom's security.
What determines whether it holds
Washington may want stronger Saudi defenses while trying to prevent a Houthi attack from triggering a wider war in Yemen, a calculus that doesn't always match how Riyadh, Ankara, and Islamabad want to respond collectively. Whether the Mecca Accords evolve into a functioning deterrent or remain largely symbolic will likely depend on whether the Houthi campaign against Saudi Arabia, now paired with the ground offensive toward Bab el-Mandeb, continues to escalate.
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U.S. tightens the financial noose on Iran's network
The U.S. has widened its financial campaign against Iran's regional proxies, sanctioning individuals and companies accused of bankrolling Kata'ib Hezbollah and Lebanese Hezbollah across Iraq, Lebanon, Turkey, and the UAE.
The Treasury Department announced the measures under "Operation Economic Outcast," targeting the financial and commercial networks that move funds to sustain Iran-aligned armed groups.
The bigger shift is in licensing policy
More consequential than the individual designations is a broader change in U.S. licensing policy: a new presumption of denial for most Iran-related requests. That shift points to Washington moving past targeted, case-by-case sanctions toward a more sweeping effort to cut off Iran and the financial infrastructure supporting its regional allies and proxies.
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Iran resumes work at Pickaxe Mountain
The International Atomic Energy Agency is monitoring new construction at Iran's Pickaxe Mountain site near the Natanz nuclear complex, raising concern that Tehran is working to restore or relocate sensitive nuclear capabilities underground. The site houses deeply buried tunnel complexes that survived earlier U.S.-Israeli strikes.
Trump's red line, tested
The activity comes shortly after U.S. President Donald Trump threatened further strikes if Iran resumed work at the site. It's unclear what exactly Iran is building or whether it connects directly to uranium enrichment, but the timing puts Tehran on a collision course with Washington's stated threshold for military action.
The next flashpoint
Any move to push sensitive facilities deeper underground would make Pickaxe Mountain hard to reach militarily and even harder to verify diplomatically. That combination makes the site a likely focal point in the next phase of the Iran conflict.
New Europe
Europe's center of gravity shifts east, politics moves right, hostility to migrants from the south rises, as ties with the U.S. fray, and fear of Russia increases
ECB hikes again as energy shock bites
The European Central Bank has raised its policy rate for the second time this year, to 2.5%, as a worsening global energy shock revives inflation across the eurozone. Disruption to Middle Eastern energy supplies and shipping is pushing up oil, gas, and transportation costs, threatening to reverse progress on inflation.
A three-way budget squeeze
The rate hike lands as European governments try to do three expensive things at once: raise defense spending, sustain military and financial support for Ukraine, and absorb the economic fallout of the Middle East conflict. Higher rates raise the cost of all three simultaneously.
Rising government borrowing costs add pressure on national budgets just as NATO members face demands for substantially higher defense spending.
Continued aid to Kyiv requires additional expenditure that now competes directly with debt-servicing costs.
The room to maneuver is shrinking
Higher energy prices, renewed inflation, and tighter monetary policy are compressing the fiscal space available to European governments at the same time. If the energy shock persists, states will face sharper trade-offs between defense commitments, Ukraine support, and domestic spending as borrowing costs keep climbing.
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Bosnian lawmakers push to internationalize Serbia dispute
Fourteen members of Bosnia and Herzegovina's parliament are seeking international backing to suspend Serbia's "special and parallel relations" agreement with Republika Srpska, the Bosnian Serb entity. They've circulated the appeal to hundreds of foreign governments, institutions, and diplomatic missions, an attempt to pull outside powers into a dispute long confined to Bosnia's internal politics.
What's behind it
The special-relations arrangement, permitted under the Dayton Peace Agreement, lets Serbia maintain close political, economic, and cultural ties with Republika Srpska. Bosniak leaders have periodically accused Belgrade of using those ties to fuel separatist sentiment within the entity. The latest push coincides with renewed controversy over Serbia's handling of convicted Bosnian Serb military commander Ratko Mladić's legacy and mounting criticism of Belgrade's nationalist politics.
Why it could escalate
A sustained international campaign against the agreement would put fresh scrutiny on Republika Srpska's ties to Belgrade and could reopen broader arguments over how the Dayton framework should be interpreted. That, in turn, risks deepening political polarization inside Bosnia itself, at a moment when Bosniak-Serb tensions are already elevated.
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What happened today:
1297 - William Wallace and Andrew Moray defeat the English at the Battle of Stirling Bridge. 1786 - The Annapolis Convention begins, helping set the stage for the U.S. Constitutional Convention. 1973 - Chilean armed forces overthrow President Salvador Allende in a military coup led by General Augusto Pinochet. 1997 - Scotland votes overwhelmingly to establish a devolved Scottish Parliament. 2001 - Al-Qaeda carries out the September 11 terrorist attacks against the United States, killing 2,977 victims. 2012 - Militants attack the U.S. diplomatic compound in Benghazi, killing Ambassador J. Christopher Stevens and three other Americans. 2020 - Bahrain and Israel announce the normalization of diplomatic relations as part of the Abraham Accords process.













