ChatGPT is insanely powerful.

But most people waste 90% of its potential by using it like Google.

These 1,000+ proven ChatGPT prompts fix that and help you work 10X faster.

Sign up for Superhuman AI and get:

Claim your free prompts

What you need to know

Iran war update: upstream oil & gas now target, Iran controls Strait of Hormuz

The Iran war is widening beyond a contest of air strikes and missile exchanges into something broader and potentially more consequential: a systems conflict affecting energy infrastructure, maritime access, political cohesion, and the resilience of states across the region. Although the immediate battlefield still favors the U.S. and Israel, which retain superior reach, intelligence penetration, and the ability to strike senior leadership targets, Iran continues to show that it can impose serious strategic costs. Missile and drone attacks, pressure on Gulf hydrocarbon assets, disruption around the Strait of Hormuz, and the activation of secondary fronts in Iraq and Lebanon have prevented tactical superiority from producing strategic closure.

The sharpest shift is in the attack envelope. Israeli strikes on South Pars and Asaluyeh marked a major escalation because they targeted upstream hydrocarbon production rather than only refineries, terminals, or downstream infrastructure. The likely repair timeline is months or years, not days. Iran responded by signaling a retaliatory list of Gulf energy targets, including facilities in Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. The result is that the war is now threatening not only oil flows, but the broader industrial foundations of the Gulf. LNG, helium, fertilizers, petrochemicals, shipping insurance, and power generation are all under pressure. Iraq is particularly exposed because the complete halt in Iranian gas imports has already cut about 3,100 megawatts from national electricity generation, even as militia activity continues around Baghdad and the airport corridor.

Iran’s leadership losses remain extraordinary, but they have not produced regime collapse. Since the war began on 28 February, senior figures reportedly killed in U.S.-Israeli strikes include Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, IRGC commander Mohammad Pakpour, armed-forces chief Abdolrahim Mousavi, Defense Minister Aziz Nasirzadeh, Basij chief Gholamreza Soleimani, Ali Shamkhani, and Ali Larijani. Even so, the Iranian state continues to function. There is still no strong public evidence of a coup, mass defections, or institutional fracture inside the armed forces. On the contrary, the more immediate pattern appears to be a tightening of IRGC control as experienced political figures are removed. Iran’s command system is damaged and stressed, but recent retaliatory salvos suggest that it remains operational enough to coordinate further escalation.

Across the Gulf, the military picture is reinforcing the economic one. The UAE said it intercepted 40 incoming weapons overnight, including 13 ballistic missiles and 27 drones, and further alerts were issued the following morning. Qatar said Iranian attacks caused significant damage at Ras Laffan, where fires were eventually brought under control. QatarEnergy has declared force majeure on LNG shipments and has reportedly sought unloading, storage, and regasification capacity in Belgium, an indication that its own facilities may remain constrained for some time. Qatar has also expelled Iranian military and security attachés. In the UAE, attacks on the Habshan gas facility and Bab fields were reportedly intercepted, though falling debris caused a fire and halted production. Saudi Arabia said it destroyed four ballistic missiles aimed at Riyadh, while debris hit two refineries near the capital. There were also signs of possible fire activity near Yanbu on the Red Sea, although crude loadings there reportedly continued through the Hormuz bypass route. Kuwait, for its part, announced the arrest of 10 operatives affiliated with Hezbollah, the second such arrest wave in a week.

The U.S. position remains militarily engaged but politically unsettled. The USS Gerald R. Ford has temporarily left theater after a serious onboard fire and is expected to remain away for repairs for two to three weeks, though the vessel remains operational. President Donald Trump publicly suggested that the U.S. might eventually let others assume responsibility for the strait, a remark that may reflect frustration with the limited progress in suppressing Iran’s missile and drone campaign and with the economic consequences of Iran’s throttling of Hormuz. That does not necessarily signal an imminent U.S. exit, but it does underline a core dilemma: Washington is trying to back Israel, reassure Gulf partners, contain global economic damage, and avoid the level of escalation that a definitive solution might require. The unexplained drone sightings over Fort McNair, where Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth live, added another sign of mounting pressure on the U.S. security establishment.

Lebanon and Iraq continue to function as active secondary fronts. In Lebanon, the Israeli Air Force struck Al Amana fuel stations on the grounds that Hezbollah personnel were allowed to maintain open fuel accounts there. The IDF has also begun destroying bridges over the Litani River, severing southern Lebanon from the rest of the country. Lebanese government websites were reportedly hacked, with a Hezbollah-linked group claiming responsibility. In Iraq, a drone reportedly targeted the C-RAM system at the U.S. embassy in Baghdad, while intense drone and rocket attacks hit U.S. facilities near Baghdad International Airport. Iraqi authorities arrested multiple PMF militia members after Chief Justice Faeq Zidan said attacks on diplomatic facilities would carry the death penalty, though senior militia commanders reportedly intervened to secure their release. Kataib Hezbollah then announced a five-day pause in attacks on U.S. targets, but only under stated conditions that included an end to Israeli attacks on South Beirut. At the same time, Iraq’s armed-forces chief reportedly ordered renewed joint checkpoint manning with PMF formations, a move that appears designed to complicate further U.S. or Israeli strikes on militia assets.

Israel itself absorbed another heavy missile wave. Iranian missiles reportedly struck Tel Aviv, killing two people, and three executive jets at Ben Gurion Airport were reportedly hit, one of them catching fire. Iranian use of cluster munitions was also reported, raising the difficulty of interception and widening the danger footprint. One reported cluster-munition strike fell in a Palestinian village near Hebron, killing three people and critically injuring others. Hezbollah also launched around 40 rockets at northern Israel. Israeli media reported that the prime minister and defense minister had instructed the IDF to kill senior Iranian and Hezbollah figures immediately whenever actionable intelligence became available, without waiting for additional political approval.

At sea, the conflict is no longer defined by whether the Strait of Hormuz is formally closed. It is better understood as a condition of coercive access, under Iranian control. Nevertheless, while India and China appear to be allowed by Iran to take some crude oil through a narrow passage through the strait, overall traffic is greatly reduced.

Crude oil exports in March fell sharply across the Gulf and Iran compared with February. Iran exported 1.516m barrels per day, down 635,000 barrels per day, a decline of 30%. Iraq recorded one of the steepest contractions, with exports falling to 1.188m barrels per day, down 2.372m barrels per day, or 67%. Kuwait’s exports dropped to 512,000 barrels per day, down 736,000 barrels per day, a fall of 59%, while Oman’s fell to 888,000 barrels per day, down 983,000 barrels per day, or 53%. Qatar exported 255,000 barrels per day, down 416,000 barrels per day, a decline of 62%. Saudi Arabia remained the largest exporter in absolute terms at 4.931m barrels per day, but that was still down 2.653m barrels per day from February, a drop of 35%. The UAE proved relatively more resilient than its peers, exporting 2.519m barrels per day, down 830,000 barrels per day, or 25%.

The industrial consequences extend well beyond oil and gas. Qatar is the world’s second-largest helium producer, and the shutdown of Ras Laffan due to Iranian strikes yesterday affects helium because it is extracted as a byproduct of natural-gas processing. The market is now estimated to be losing roughly 5.2 million cubic meters of helium a month, with almost no spare capacity elsewhere. Prices have already doubled and could rise much further if disruption lasts 60 to 90 days. That matters because helium has no viable substitute in several critical sectors, including semiconductors, MRI scanners, scientific research, and deep-sea diving. South Korean and Chinese firms are particularly exposed because of their dependence on Qatari supply. QatarEnergy has also suspended urea, methanol, and polymer output, adding stress to fertilizer and petrochemical chains. Even an immediate restart would not produce quick normalization; full supply-chain recovery could still take four to six months, leaving a vulnerability window of probably around six to nine months.

Oil prices reflect this tension, though paper benchmarks still lag the physical market. Brent closed at $107.38 a barrel and WTI at $96.32, while Oman crude reportedly reached $173 in physical trade. That divergence captures the wider truth of the war: formal markets still imply stress, but not collapse; physical conditions in the region suggest something more severe, fragmented, and difficult to stabilize.

The larger strategic contradiction is becoming clearer. For Israel, the war’s objectives may remain limited and militarily sustainable. It does not need to transform Iran or overthrow the regime to claim success. It needs only to reduce the missile and drone threat to a more tolerable level, degrade the infrastructure that enables repeated salvos, and preserve freedom of action for future strikes. In that sense, the Israeli approach resembles long-term suppression rather than decisive victory.

The U.S. faces a harder burden. As the ultimate external guarantor of Gulf security, Washington cannot define success so narrowly. Iran does not need to defeat the U.S. militarily to impose failure on it. It needs only to sustain a low but persistent level of pressure on Gulf monarchies, enough to weaken investor confidence, raise security and insurance costs, disrupt trade, and gradually erode the economic model on which regional stability rests. That creates an asymmetry of burdens. Israel can live with a recurring threat if it remains manageable. The U.S. cannot easily do the same in the Gulf, because its credibility rests on preventing chronic insecurity from taking root.

The war, then, is entering a more dangerous phase than the military map alone suggests. Iran’s command structure appears badly damaged, but still functional. The Gulf’s energy and industrial base is now under direct pressure. Iraq is becoming more fragile. Hormuz is constrained, even if not formally closed. The next major escalation could come at Bab al-Mandab, where disruption would magnify the shock to global trade. The central problem for Washington is that its strategic requirements may point toward an outcome, namely the end of Iran’s capacity and willingness to wage this long war of attrition, that it does not appear willing to pursue at the necessary level of escalation.

Meanwhile, in a related development: Israel’s Foreign Ministry announced that six additional countries, Iceland, Moldova, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Liechtenstein, have officially designated the Revolutionary Guards as a terrorist organization.

Birthplace of civilization

Israel strikes Syrian regime sites after attacks on Druze in Suwayda

Israel said it had struck Syrian regime infrastructure in southern Syria after attacks on Druze civilians in Suwayda, opening another front in an already volatile regional crisis. According to the Israeli military, the strikes hit a command center and weapons facilities inside Syrian military compounds, and were presented as a warning that Israel would not tolerate harm to the Druze community across the border.

The move is significant because it shows Israel again linking local violence in southern Syria to its own security posture, not merely as an internal Syrian matter but as something that can trigger direct military action.

That raises the risk of broader friction in the south, especially around Suwayda and nearby regime-held positions, and adds to pressure on Damascus at a moment when the wider region is already under severe geopolitical strain.

It’s now the U.S. vs China, everyone needs to pick a side

Ukraine talks to resume in the United States

Talks on a possible settlement in Ukraine are expected to resume in the United States on Saturday, 21 March, after a pause that Kyiv says stemmed largely from Washington’s preoccupation with the war in Iran.

President Volodymyr Zelensky said Ukraine’s political negotiating team is already on its way, suggesting that Kyiv is keen to restart the process quickly, even as the broader diplomatic effort remains stuck and Russia has shown no meaningful movement on its central demands.

The significance is twofold. First, Ukraine is seeking to demonstrate that it remains engaged, pragmatic, and unwilling to bear responsibility for delay. Second, the mere holding of a meeting should not be mistaken for progress. Earlier U.S.-brokered talks have run into difficulty over venue, sequencing, and substance, above all because Russia continues to press for terms that Kyiv cannot accept, including substantial territorial concessions and lasting constraints on Ukraine’s strategic orientation.

U.S. moves to ease Belarus sanctions

The U.S. is preparing to lift sanctions on several Belarusian banks and on the potash sector, according to U.S. Special Envoy John Cole.

Cole said the restrictions on the Belarusian Ministry of Finance, the Development Bank of the Republic of Belarus, and Belinvestbank would be removed. He also said that the Belarusian Potash Company and Belaruskali, the country’s main potash producers, would be taken off the U.S. sanctions list.

Cole added that the easing of restrictions would proceed quickly and said he had discussed the matter with officials at the Ministry of Finance before his visit to Minsk.

It’s unclear what the U.S. will receive in return.

U.S. and Japan deepen alliance with energy, defense and critical-minerals deals

Following talks yesterday between U.S. President Donald Trump and Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi, several agreements on strengthening the relationship between the two countries were reached.

Takaichi said that she and President Donald Trump had agreed to expand U.S. energy production. The official White House fact sheet says the second tranche of Japanese investments includes “up to $40 billion” from GE Vernova Hitachi in Tennessee and Alabama to build small modular reactor power plants. Takaichi also said the two countries would examine a joint crude-oil stockpiling venture to strengthen supply security for Japan and Asia. She said Japan and the U.S. had also finalized three critical-minerals projects, including cooperation on the development of rare-earth mud resources near Minamitorishima. The two countries, she added, would deepen security ties through joint missile development and production in order to reinforce deterrence under their bilateral alliance. Japan also proposed a joint project to stockpile U.S.-sourced crude oil, with Takaichi arguing that diversification of supply was central to regional energy stability.

Takaichi also said she had conveyed her willingness to meet Kim Jong Un, North Korea’s leader, directly, and added that Washington had expressed its readiness to cooperate on resolving the abduction issue.

On Iran, Takaichi said Japan and the U.S. had agreed to remain in close coordination to preserve stability in the Middle East, including safe navigation through the Strait of Hormuz.

Takaichi said the talks had confirmed “concrete cooperative measures” across economic security, energy, and defense, and described the U.S.-Japan alliance as indispensable in an uncertain world.

Move fast and break things

Trump administration narrows birthright-citizenship claim before Supreme Court

The Trump administration has filed its reply brief in the birthright-citizenship case before the Supreme Court. It begins by arguing that the “main object” of the Citizenship Clause was to confer citizenship on formerly enslaved people and their children, whose allegiance to the United States had generally been established through generations of parental domicile. By contrast, it argues that foreigners merely passing through the United States, as well as those who enter the country illegally, lack the necessary ties of allegiance and therefore do not secure what it describes as the “priceless and profound gift” of citizenship for their children.

The brief goes on to argue that, to receive citizenship under the clause, a person must be both born “in the United States” and “subject to the jurisdiction thereof”. In the administration’s telling, that language grants citizenship only to children who are fully subject to the United States’ political jurisdiction. On that basis, it contends that the children of those who are in the country temporarily or unlawfully do not qualify, because their parents are not domiciled in the United States and therefore do not owe the required allegiance to it. The brief adds that those present only temporarily are, by definition, not domiciled in the country, while those present illegally lack the legal capacity to establish such a domicile.

Center of Gravity sign up link: https://www.namea-group.com/the-daily-brief