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What you need to know

IAEA team returns to Iran as Geneva talks stall

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Grossi said the first team of inspectors is back in Iran and is “about to restart” work. Their presence signals a cautious operational thaw after inspections were curtailed earlier in the summer.

For now, the restart appears limited. Inspectors are in country, yet the scope of access and the tempo of routine activities still depend on high-level Iranian approvals. In short, the team has returned; full and timely access is not yet assured.

The timing intersects with European diplomacy. Officials from France, Germany, and the United Kingdom met Iranian counterparts in Geneva on 26 August. The session produced no conclusive result. Iranian representatives floated broad promises, but these lacked detail, timelines, and operational substance.

The European trio is weighing whether to trigger the U.N. “snapback” mechanism, which would restore crushing international sanctions on Iran unless inspection and transparency benchmarks show tangible progress.

Practically, Europe is seeking the immediate restoration of IAEA access to priority sites, the reinstallation of monitoring equipment, and clarity on uranium stockpiles and enrichment levels. The presence of the first inspection team matters, yet the test of any diplomatic pause will be whether those concrete requirements are met quickly.

We are watching whether inspectors gain timely entry to high-priority facilities and reinstall monitors; whether updated data on stockpiles and enrichment are provided; whether additional inspection teams rotate in to widen coverage; and whether demonstrable inspection results temper calls for new sanctions or deadline-driven moves at the U.N. Security Council. A prompt, verifiable expansion of access would strengthen the case for a short diplomatic extension. Absent that, pressure will grow to proceed with snapback immediately.

Bottom line: Grossi’s confirmation opens the door to renewed verification, but Geneva did not deliver a breakthrough. Unless general assurances are translated into specific, verified inspection steps within days, the E3 are likely to keep the sanctions track firmly on the table.

It’s now the U.S. vs China, everyone else needs to pick a side

Trump says the U.S. no longer funds Ukraine as allies buy American arms

Yesterday, President Donald Trump claimed that the U.S. is no longer funding Ukraine, and is instead profiting from sales of weapons to NATO countries that then send those systems to Ukraine.

Beginning on 20 January 2025, the White House paused large parts of State and USAID foreign assistance pending review. In practice, that curtailed grant-based U.S. economic support and some security funding for Ukraine, with limited humanitarian carve-outs. Court challenges and administrative adjustments have followed through late August.

The pipeline has shifted toward Europe-financed transfers. European NATO members and the EU are buying U.S. systems, such as Patriot interceptors, artillery ammunition, and precision munitions, and then passing them to Ukraine. Public reports describe about $1bn of American kit sold to European allies for onward transfer. NATO coordinates the “shopping lists,” and the U.S. provides intelligence, surveillance, and other enablers, while avoiding any deployment of U.S. ground troops.

Because allies are paying for most purchases through the Foreign Military Sales program, receipts flow primarily to U.S. defense firms rather than requiring new U.S. budget outlays.

Arms transfers brokered by the U.S. government set a record in fiscal year 2024, well above $100bn, driven heavily by European demand. Europe’s imports of major arms in the early-to-mid 2020s more than doubled compared with the previous five-year period, with U.S. vendors supplying the majority share.

Company results reflect strong order books in air defense and missiles, although profits still vary by program because of tariffs, supply chains, and one-off charges.

But does the U.S. truly “no longer fund” Ukraine? Not entirely. While much grant aid has been paused, the U.S. continues to facilitate sales and services to Ukraine through narrower channels, and parts of Congress continue to push for security-assistance appropriations. A tidier description is that grants are largely paused, while sales and security cooperation continue.

For Washington, near-term federal outlays are lower, while foreign-funded orders support the U.S. defense-industrial base.

For Europe, the fiscal burden is heavier and reliance on U.S. equipment persists in the short run, creating pressure to expand European production to avoid bottlenecks.
For Kyiv, key systems still arrive, but timing and volumes depend more on European financing and politics, as well as U.S. export queues, than before.

America First

U.S. tariffs on India rise to 50 percent as ties fray

As of this morning, the U.S. has doubled duties on many Indian imports by adding a 25% levy to an existing 25% rate, lifting total tariffs to as high as 50% across labor-intensive categories such as garments, gems and jewelry, footwear, furniture, chemicals, and some marine products.

For now, smartphones and some electronics appear to be spared. Washington says the step is meant to penalize New Delhi’s continued purchases of discounted Russian crude, which the White House argues help finance Moscow’s war effort.

Legally, officials describe the move as resting on a mix of authorities, including the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) and Section 232, invoked via recent executive actions that broaden a “reciprocal tariff” program and target countries importing Russian oil.

Indian exporters expect swift pain. Industry groups in textiles and apparel are already warning of production cuts. The rupee has drifted toward record lows, and equities wobbled around the announcement window. Oil prices have been steady so far, with traders watching whether Indian refiners actually trim Russian purchases. New Delhi has called the tariffs unjust, is exploring safeguard options, and, crucially, signals no intention to halt Russian oil outright, though refiners may modestly reduce volumes.

A near-term U.S.–India trade deal looks unlikely, though both sides are leaving the door open to talks. The spat could complicate Quad cooperation and divert U.S. sourcing toward Vietnam, China, and Mexico.

We’re monitoring any carve-outs (perhaps pharmaceuticals or key electronics inputs) and waiting to see the formal product lists as implementing notices are published. It will be interesting to see whether India files, or threatens, a WTO challenge and whether it will counters with any particular targeted trade measures. It’s likely that we will see increased Indian outreach to China, as a way of signaling displeasure.

Birth pangs in the birthplace of civilization

Türkiye opens a limited campaign in northern Syria as Russia and the U.S. hedge

Türkiye has launched a time-bound operation in northern Syria, with officials signaling a 45–60-day window to degrade Kurdish paramilitary networks embodied in the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), harden the border, and shape post-conflict security arrangements.

Early moves suggest sequenced drone and artillery strikes, followed by limited ground incursions and quick consolidation around key road junctions and river crossings. Local reports cast this as the latest phase of Ankara’s rolling pressure on the SDF through 2024–2025, following the success of the Turkish-backed rebel campaign against Assad and seizing power on 9 December last year.

For Washington, the immediate priority is containing Islamic State risks tied to the Al Hol prison complex, where up to 50,000 former Islamic State fighters and their families are held by the SDF. U.S. military coordination with SDF guards is likely to focus on preventing jailbreaks and unrest. The U.S. has stepped-up aerial surveillance, prepared quick-reaction support, and has contingency plans for camp security.

If the operation runs on a 45–60-day clock, phases are likely to include one to two weeks of intensive strikes, a short ground push to carve buffer pockets, then a hold-and-handover period in which local auxiliaries and police take over.

Islamic State opportunism, direct conflict with the SDF, and civilian displacement are the main spoilers, with the remaining U.S. forces in north-eastern Syria (at least 1,000 troops), awkwardly sitting between their Turkish NATO ally and the SDF (which the US has supported for over a decade).

Instability from Sahel to Horn of Africa amid state fragility, Russian interference, & Islamist insurgencies

Washington seeks a new strategy in the Sahel

Washington is tiptoeing back into the central Sahel with a more transactional pitch, favoring commercial ties and targeted security cooperation over large aid packages. The reset has unfolded through quiet visits to junta-ruled Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, where U.S. envoys floated tighter counterterrorism cooperation alongside talks on access to critical minerals.

In recent weeks, senior U.S. officials have shuttled to the capitals of Burkina Faso, Niger, and Mali. Local sources point to a pragmatic agenda of rebuilding ties, pursuing practical security cooperation that yields immediate battlefield gains, and reopening channels for trade and investment.

American officials in meetings with local interlocutors have indicated a readiness to provide logistical and operational backing against jihadist groups, including intelligence sharing, air mobility and medevac, limited training, and equipment.

But, in parallel, America’s representatives are probing opportunities for U.S. firms in gold, lithium, and other strategic minerals. In Mali, discussions have reportedly paired counterterrorism help with access to gold and lithium; in Burkina Faso and Niger, the focus includes supply chains for battery materials and, where feasible, uranium and hydrocarbon logistics.

The United States lost its most important Sahel platform when relations with Niger deteriorated, prompting a drawdown just as Russia’s security footprint expanded and Chinese investment deepened.

Between 2020 and 2024, a wave of coups in the central Sahel reshaped security partnerships and spurred the exit of French and U.S. forces.

The three juntas aligned through the Alliance of Sahel States on 16 September 2023 and announced a confederation on 6 July 2024, signaling a break with traditional regional and international relationships and a pivot toward alternative partners, especially Russian security personnel.

Since then, jihadist violence has increased exponentially in these three states.

The U.S. reengagement aims to retain counterterrorism visibility, hedge against geopolitical rivals like China and Russia, and secure future inputs for the tech, energy, and defense industries.

For their part, the Sahel juntas, now aligned in the Alliance of Sahel States, are building parallel economic institutions and courting non-Western partners, which raises the cost of U.S. absence.

What Washington wants:

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