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What you need to know

European diplomats from Britain, France, and Germany are poised today, 28 August, to trigger the U.N. “snapback” mechanism under Resolution 2231, restoring the pre-2015 sanctions architecture on Iran to prevent key restrictions from expiring before “Termination Day” on 18 October 2025.

Procedurally, any JCPOA participant can notify the Security Council of “significant non-performance,” opening a 30-day window in which a resolution would be required to preserve sanctions relief; a single veto blocks sanctions relief, so the prior measures: arms and missile restrictions, nuclear-related prohibitions, asset freezes, travel bans, and cargo inspections, re-enter into force by default.

Diplomatically, the Europeans may leave room to delay practical implementation if Tehran restores full IAEA access and engages on de-escalation, but once the letter is filed the legal clock runs to about 27 September.

Russia and China will object politically yet lack a procedural route to stop the outcome. Markets and compliance teams should expect tighter enforcement signals and headline risk around energy and shipping.

It’s now the U.S. vs China, everyone else needs to pick a side

Ukrainian drone attacks on Russian oil infrastructure continue to devastate

This morning, Ukrainian drones struck the Afipsky refinery in Krasnodar Krai (a massive fire was reported locally) and reportedly hit the Novokuibyshevsk and Kuybyshev refineries in Samara Oblast, with multiple accounts pointing to blazes at both sites.

The commander of Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces Robert Brovdi said an additional 4.7% of Russian refining capacity was knocked offline overnight and a cumulative 21% over the first two weeks of August 2025, figures that remain unverified.

Independent compilations for 25–28 August put disrupted capacity closer to about 17%, while Russian data for the first 19 days of August show gasoline output down about 8.6% year over year and diesel down about 10.3%, signaling significant, though uneven, disruption.

Beyond Afipsky and the Samara sites, earlier August strikes cut throughput at Ryazan and Saratov refineries, and repeat hits on the Druzhba pipeline’s Unecha hub twice halted oil flows to Hungary and Slovakia.

Inside Russia, shortages and price spikes are becoming harder to hide. Wholesale A-95 is roughly 50% higher than in January, and the gasoline export ban has been extended from 31 August to 31 October to stabilize the market.

Open-source evidence also points to a dense redeployment of Pantsir-S1 around leadership sites (Valdai, Novo-Ogaryovo, Sochi, and near the Kremlin), suggesting finite short-range air defenses are being concentrated on regime protection, which may create openings for Ukrainian attacks on energy nodes. August hits on Ryazan, Saratov, Volgograd, Syzran, Novoshakhtinsk, and Afipsky, plus the Unecha disruptions, fit that pattern but do not mean Ukraine can completely destroy Russia’s economy, rather they show that refining and pipelines are persistently vulnerable.

Netting it out, roughly 14–17% of capacity appears disrupted in late August, producing visible fuel tightness even as Russia raises crude exports by about 200 kb/d to monetize barrels it cannot refine, so we should expect a cat-and-mouse cycle of repairs and re-strikes, with periodic pipeline interruptions spilling into Central Europe.

Heavy Russian attack on Kyiv overnight
Russia launched a large, mixed strike on Kyiv overnight, killing at least twelve people and injuring dozens. Multiple residential blocks were damaged during a nine-hour air alert, according to city authorities.

Ukraine reports that Russia is adding jet-powered Shahed-type loitering munitions to its salvos. These are widely described as a Russianized variant of Iran’s Shahed-238, though some analysts call the platform ‘Geran-3’ and others suggest an upgraded Geran-2, so the designation remains contested. Open-source performance figures indicate cruise speeds around 500–600 km/h (310–373 mph), endurance near two hours, operating altitudes above 9,000 m (29,528 ft), and warheads of roughly 50 kg (110 lb). Compared with prop-driven Gerans, these jets fly higher and much faster, compressing defenders’ engagement windows.

Jet-powered Shaheds travel fast enough that mobile fire teams and many short-range systems have less time to detect and engage, which pushes defenses toward scarce, expensive medium- and high-end surface-to-air missiles. That shift benefits Russia’s saturation tactics, where large drone waves are paired with ballistic and cruise missiles to overwhelm defenders.

If confirmed, European or Chinese-origin turbines in Russian strike drones would sharpen export-control questions. Separate reporting has documented Russian use of Chinese engines in other long-range kamikaze drones, pointing to persistent weaknesses in sanctions regimes, particularly through commercial and hobbyist markets.

NATO steps up the sub hunt in the Norwegian Sea

Between 24 and 27 August 2025, NATO surged anti-submarine patrols over the Norwegian Sea, with British, American, and Norwegian P-8 Poseidon aircraft flying persistent orbits from Scotland, Iceland, and northern Norway in what appears to be a sustained operation rather than a drill.

The USS Gerald R. Ford has been operating in the North Sea, within reach of the patrol box slightly south of the most intense activity.

Satellite imagery indicates that all three Russian Northern Fleet Yasen-class nuclear submarines, Severodvinsk, Kazan, and Arkhangelsk, were out of their berths around 25 August, which suggests they were at sea.

The procedure that the Russians appear to have followed with the USS Gerald R. Ford is straightforward: if a Yasen rides a carrier group’s outer wake, it can collect acoustic and electronic signatures, a unique “thumbprint,” that improves future tracking and targeting; this is why NATO layers the GIUK–Norwegian approaches with towed arrays and sonobuoys.

Open-source observers also note an uptick in AIS-broadcasting allied vessels in the Danish Straits, including mine and submarine-support units, a pattern consistent with heightened readiness or infrastructure protection.

In short, allied behavior points to a live contact of interest with a Russian nuclear submarine, kept at arm’s length over several days.

America First

Denmark confronts Washington over alleged covert lobbying in Greenland

On 27 August, Denmark’s foreign minister, Lars Løkke Rasmussen, summoned the U.S. chargé d’affaires in Copenhagen, Mark Stroh, after public broadcaster DR reported that at least three Americans with connections to President Donald Trump had carried out covert influence efforts in Greenland. Rasmussen called any interference in the Kingdom of Denmark’s internal affairs “unacceptable.”

DR’s reporting, citing Danish, Greenlandic, and U.S. sources, alleges the trio worked to “penetrate Greenlandic society,” compiling lists of pro- and anti-Trump figures, cultivating local political and business contacts, and exploiting contentious narratives to weaken ties between Nuuk and Copenhagen and bolster pro-U.S. sentiment.

Denmark’s security service has separately warned that Greenland is vulnerable to influence campaigns designed to create rifts with Denmark. The activity appears aimed at accelerating Greenland’s distancing from Denmark rather than classic election meddling.

Washington acknowledged the activity but said it does not control or direct the actions of private U.S. citizens, while reaffirming close U.S.–Denmark–Greenland relations. The identities of the alleged operatives have not been disclosed.

Why it matters: Greenland is strategically central to Arctic air and sea lanes and hosts the U.S. Thule Air Base. It also has significant mineral potential. President Donald Trump’s well-publicized interest in Greenland since 2019, and subsequent U.S. attention to the island’s resources and autonomy debate, form the geopolitical backdrop

Europe's center of gravity shifts east, politics moves right, hostility to migrants from the south rises, as ties with the U.S. fray

France’s IMF scare is about politics, not solvency - yet

France’s Minister of the Economy and Finance Bruno Le Maire said IMF involvement is “a risk in front of us” if the minority government loses an 8 September confidence vote and market conditions worsen.

The warning comes amid a political crunch for Prime Minister François Bayrou, whose deficit-cutting plan faces unified opposition from the left and the National Rally. Markets have flickered: the CAC 40 dipped and French 10-year OAT yields edged toward about 3.5%. Analysts argue that the problem is the debt trajectory and policy paralysis rather than near-term solvency.

Proposed consolidation, including scrapping two public holidays, has stalled, and fears of outside oversight, whether from Brussels under EU fiscal rules or, in a stress scenario, the IMF, have moved into mainstream commentary.

For a euro-area sovereign, any “IMF bailout” would in practice mean an EU-led program via the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), with possible IMF participation, similar to the 2010–13 troika arrangements, and triggered only if market access deteriorates sharply and domestic politics block credible fiscal measures.

That remains a tail risk, not the base case; even critical coverage presents it as a contingent possibility tied to government collapse and further spread widening. The core risk is political: if Bayrou falls and President Emmanuel Macron cannot quickly assemble a workable majority or pass a budget, extended uncertainty could lift borrowing costs and bring external conditionality into play.

Germany’s service plan readies a draft without reviving conscription

On 27 August 2025, Germany’s cabinet backed a “voluntary-first” service model that does not reinstate conscription, yet readies the state to scale up quickly if needed.

Beginning in 2026, all men turning 18 must complete a suitability questionnaire (women may do so voluntarily).

From 1 July 2027, all 18-year-old men would undergo a mandatory medical examination, regardless of whether they volunteer.

The aim is to keep an up-to-date pool of medically screened citizens so the government can mobilize faster in an emergency, while enlistment remains voluntary unless the Bundestag later decides to switch on a draft.

Officials present the move as part of a broader defense buildup after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The Bundeswehr has about 181,000 active personnel and wants to grow to roughly 260,000, plus around 200,000 reservists.

Questionnaires and medicals are meant to restore grip over readiness by identifying in advance who is fit and willing. Conscientious objectors would retain civil-service alternatives.

What changes for whom:

Men at 18 (from 2026): mandatory questionnaire; from 1 July 2027: mandatory medical exam.

Women at 18: questionnaire is optional; no compulsory medical exam yet.

Is this the return of the draft? No. This is preparatory, and activation would require a separate parliamentary decision. But it is a reflection of the growing fear of Russian aggression in western Europe.

Move fast and break things

CDC leaders resign after Monarez’s removal

Following the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) announcement that Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) director Susan Monarez is “no longer director,” less than a month into her tenure, three senior leaders resigned late on Wednesday:

In public posts and internal notes, the departing officials cited the politicization of public health, rising vaccine misinformation, and policy or budget shifts they fear could weaken scientific guidance.

Daskalakis released a resignation letter, while Houry and Jernigan referred to broader policy concerns.

Monarez’s removal is being contested by her legal team (indeed she has refused to leave), and the leadership rupture has been linked to clashes with HHS Secretary Robert F. Kennedy Jr. over vaccine policy and CDC advisory structures, including possible reversals of COVID-19 guidance, details that may yet change.

In the near term, leadership gaps at the National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases and the National Center for Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases could slow guidance and coordination as the U.S. approaches the autumn respiratory season.

Instability from Sahel to Horn of Africa amid state fragility, Russian interference, & Islamist insurgencies

Sudan’s uneasy homecoming as Sudanese army gets upper hand

According to the UN’s International Organization for Migration, between November 2024 and July 2025, about 2 million people returned to their home areas across Sudan, the great majority, 1,549,211, moving from sites inside the country and roughly 455,091 coming back from abroad.

Survey data indicate that 97% of returnees cite improved security as the chief reason, reflecting recent gains by the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the partial reopening of services in some localities.

The picture is uneven. In areas now held by the SAF, families are repairing homes, reopening shops and reconnecting to electricity and water where possible. In Khartoum, thousands have returned despite shattered infrastructure and thin policing, a sign of both the pull of home and the push of worsening conditions in exile.

By contrast, Darfur and parts of Kordofan remain perilous as the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) contest territory, prompting fresh flight rather than return. The result is a patchwork: back-and-forth flows toward SAF-held towns, continued outflows from RSF-affected areas and large pockets where people cannot go home because safety, services and livelihoods have yet to recover.

This is a fragile opportunity rather than a settled trend. Many returns are self-organized and conditional, as households bet that security will hold long enough to rebuild, yet they face shortages of shelter materials, paid work, health care and clean water. Without a quick expansion of basic services and protection, some returns may reverse. Meanwhile, the displacement caseload remains vast, with millions still uprooted inside Sudan or sheltering in neighboring states.

Center of Gravity sign up link: https://www.namea-group.com/the-daily-brief