You don’t need to be a coder to make AI work for you. Subscribe to Mindstream and get 200+ proven ideas showing how real people are using ChatGPT, Midjourney, and other tools to earn on the side.

From small wins to full-on ventures, this guide helps you turn AI skills into real results, without the overwhelm.

Get Your Free Guide

What you need to know

Ukrainian advances in bitter war of attrition 

Reports and online chatter in recent days have converged on two places that keep reappearing in Ukraine’s war: Pokrovsk in the Donbas and Kupyansk in the northeast.

In the Pokrovsk sector, Ukrainian accounts describe Russia committing high-quality troops, including most or all of the 76th Air Assault Division, to assaults that are being shredded by drones and layered defenses. Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces has been publishing unusually large daily tallies of personnel hit and equipment destroyed, reinforcing the idea that Russia’s elite formations are paying heavily for marginal gains.

The reason Pokrovsk matters is geography and logistics. Pokrovsk sits astride key road and rail arteries that help sustain Ukraine’s defensive belt in the Donbas. If Russia can seize the town, or even make its approaches too dangerous to use consistently, Ukraine’s ability to rotate units, move ammunition, and stabilize neighboring sectors becomes more difficult. That, in turn, could create opportunities for Russia to press toward larger Ukrainian strongpoints farther northeast in Donetsk oblast, while also increasing pressure on routes running westward.

Kupyansk is a similar story on a different axis. It is a transport hub whose value lies in linking forces and supply lines across the Kharkiv-Luhansk direction, and it sits by the Oskil River, which functions as a natural defensive line. Control of crossings, bridgeheads, and the ability to move men and materiel across the river shapes what either side can realistically sustain on either bank.

That is why Kupyansk repeatedly becomes the subject of sweeping claims, “liberated,” “mostly controlled,” “nearly retaken,” that are hard to verify cleanly in the moment. More reliable than percentages is the underlying logic: if Ukraine can push Russian forces away from the river line and deny them stable positions near the city, it eases pressure on the northeast and complicates any renewed Russian drive in Kharkiv oblast. If Russia can do the opposite, it improves its posture for continued offensives and makes Ukraine’s defense more expensive.

Taken together, the emphasis on Pokrovsk and Kupyansk reflects an old truth about this war: the fiercest fighting is often about the unglamorous machinery of war, roads, rails, river lines, and the ability to keep units fed, fueled, and reinforced, rather than dramatic breakthroughs. The online claims may overreach, but they point to two locations where logistical advantage can translate into operational momentum.

It’s the U.S. vs China, everyone else needs to choose a side

Europe’s emergency clause and Russia’s frozen billions

The European Union is moving to make the freeze on the Russian central bank’s reserves in Europe effectively open-ended, using the bloc’s emergency powers under Article 122. The immediate prize is roughly €210 billion [$246.5 billion] in Russian central-bank assets immobilized under EU sanctions, most of it held in Belgium via Euroclear, about €185 billion [$217.2 billion].

The legal mechanics matter as much as the money. Under today’s sanctions regime, the immobilization must be renewed every six months, creating regular veto points. Article 122 is meant for “severe difficulties” and allows certain measures to be adopted by qualified majority, which limits the leverage of any single capital, including Hungary and Slovakia, to block a rollover or extract concessions.

The second objective is financial, not merely punitive. The European Commission has floated a “reparations loan” structure for Ukraine that would be easier to sustain through 2026-27. One option is to borrow, for a limited period, against the cash balances that have accumulated at financial institutions because transactions involving the Russian central bank’s reserves are prohibited, then channel the proceeds to Ukraine. The claim is that this would not confiscate the principal and would be wrapped in safeguards and guarantees.

That helps explain Belgium’s anxiety. If the legal basis is challenged later, the country hosting the infrastructure of the freeze worries about liability, including what happens if sanctions are lifted without a broader settlement. The EU is preparing guarantees aimed at shielding Belgium from financial repercussions, precisely because most of the immobilized assets sit in its jurisdiction.

Moscow’s response has been to threaten litigation at scale. On 12 December 2025, Russia’s central bank said EU plans to use its assets were illegal and announced it was suing Euroclear in a Moscow court to recover losses linked to the freeze. It also warned it would contest any EU move in national courts and international venues. Russia’s argument is straightforward: sovereign immunity should protect a central bank’s reserves, and turning immobilized funds into collateral for Ukraine financing crosses a line from sanctions into appropriation.

Article 122 is a way to harden policy against veto politics inside the EU and against intimidation outside it, while keeping the policy framed, for now, as immobilization and structured borrowing rather than outright confiscation. Whether it holds will depend on political endurance, including at the EU summit on 18 December, and on courts that Russia seems eager to activate.

EU sanctions widen against Russia’s shadow fleet and hybrid operators

EU ambassadors have agreed on another round of sanctions that pursues two aims at once: tightening the net around Russia’s “shadow fleet” for moving oil, and broadening listings aimed at Russia-linked destabilizing activity in Europe.

On the maritime side, the measures would add 43 vessels linked to the shadow fleet, along with nine individuals and companies accused of supporting it. The intent is practical rather than symbolic. Once a ship is listed, it becomes far harder to use European ports and services, and riskier for mainstream insurers, brokers, and service providers to deal with it. That raises costs, increases delays, and pushes Russia and its intermediaries toward more opaque and fragile logistics. Over time, the goal is to reduce the reliability of the workarounds that keep Russian oil exports flowing despite restrictions.

The package also targets a separate category: actors deemed to be destabilizing Europe. Ambassadors have agreed to list 12 individuals and two organizations, including Russian intelligence-linked figures, members associated with the Valdai Club, and foreign nationals working on Russia’s behalf. This signals a broader European effort to treat “hybrid” pressure, including sabotage, influence operations, and other covert activity, as a sanctions problem, not only a policing or counterintelligence one. Listings typically impose asset freezes and travel bans, and bar EU persons from providing funds or services to those named.

Strategically, the combination matters. Going after vessels and facilitators targets the machinery of sanctions evasion, not just prominent officials. Adding foreign nationals is meant to deter third-country intermediaries by showing that helping Russia can carry personal and commercial consequences, even for non-Russians. It also reflects a shift toward using sanctions as a tool of internal security policy, not merely foreign policy.

Procedurally, “ambassadors agreed” usually means the package is politically cleared and heading for formal adoption, after which the legal text and the full list of names and vessels will be published. The broader 20th package is expected to follow by the end of the year, though the timing can still slip if internal negotiations drag on.

The EU’s last turn away from Russian gas

EU ambassadors have backed legislation to end the bloc’s remaining purchases of Russian gas on two deadlines: Russian LNG would be phased out by the end of 2026, and Russian pipeline gas by September 2027. The plan still needs final sign-off from EU ministers and the European Parliament, but it is expected to pass despite opposition from Hungary and Slovakia.

The context is a steep, if incomplete, decoupling. Russia supplied about 45% of the EU’s gas before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine; by late 2025 that share had fallen to about 12%, as pipeline flows shrank and Europe shifted to other suppliers, boosted storage, and cut demand. What remains is smaller in volume but harder politically, because it is concentrated in a handful of countries and bound up with long-term contracts and physical constraints.

The headline dates conceal a more detailed timetable and a split between LNG and pipelines. In broad terms, the EU aims to stop LNG imports first, since LNG is easier to replace with cargoes from other suppliers, then end pipeline purchases later, because dependence is concentrated in landlocked states with fewer immediate alternatives. In practice, the remaining Russian gas is no longer a single tap from the east. It is a mix of LNG cargoes arriving at coastal terminals and pipeline deliveries to a narrower set of member states.

The institutional design matters. Sanctions typically require unanimity, which gives holdouts a veto. This phase-out is being pursued through energy and internal-market legislation, which generally does not rely on unanimity. That is why resistance from Budapest and Bratislava is politically loud but may not be decisive. It also explains the careful, rule-based framing. The EU is trying to move from recurring cliff-edge negotiations to a clearer legal pathway so markets and member states can plan around a known end date.

The pain will be uneven. The countries most exposed are those that are landlocked, pipeline-dependent, or both. Hungary, in particular, has relied heavily on Russian pipeline gas routed via Türkiye, rather than via the shrinking routes across Ukraine. For such states, replacing Russian supply is not simply a matter of signing a contract. It requires access to LNG terminals, pipeline capacity from neighbors, and sometimes new infrastructure. Even so, the most exposed states have been exploring alternative routes, including regional LNG access and multi-year supply arrangements, even as they resist the policy.

Because Russian gas is now a far smaller slice of Europe’s market, the EU is not attempting the 2022 feat of replacing nearly half its imports at once. The aim is to remove the last stubborn tranche in a way markets can absorb: more LNG from a wider set of suppliers, better interconnection and storage discipline, and continued efficiency gains and electrification. The risks remain real. LNG is globally traded and price-sensitive. In a cold winter, Europe can still be outbid, especially if Asian demand spikes. The EU is betting that diversified contracting and stronger storage management will make those shocks more manageable by 2026-27.

The policy is not only about Ukraine. It is an attempt to remove a lever of coercion from Europe’s energy system. Cutting Russian gas to 12% reduced Moscow’s leverage; cutting it to zero aims to remove it. The trade-off is greater exposure to the politics of LNG markets, shipping routes, and competition among alternative suppliers.

Russia’s budget strain deepens as oil revenues slide

Russia’s budget numbers for January through November 2025 look increasingly like those of a war economy under pressure. Revenues were flat in nominal terms, rising by only 0.7% from a year earlier, while expenditures climbed by 12.5%. The gap pushed the deficit to roughly RUB 4.3 trillion [$53.6 billion]. Using a representative mid-market rate of about ₽80.26 to the U.S. dollar on 12 December, a year-end deficit closer to RUB 7.4 trillion would amount to roughly $92.2 billion.

The soft spot is the one that always matters most in Moscow: oil and gas. Those revenues fell by 22.4% over the first 11 months, and November was worse, with a reported drop of about a third. The immediate culprit is price. Urals crude slid sharply into late 2025, averaging in the mid-$40s per barrel in November, with reports of spot levels in the high $30s at Novorossiysk, alongside discounts of more than $25 versus Brent. This is not only a story about lower prices. It is also about higher frictions. Sanctions risk, insurance and shipping constraints, and a narrower pool of willing buyers all translate into wider discounts and lower realized revenues. A firmer ruble, if it persists, tightens the squeeze by converting each export dollar into fewer rubles.

Those frictions show up in shipping, too. Market chatter about Russian crude sitting on tankers, including claims that 180 million barrels are “stuck at sea,” likely blends cargoes delayed in transit, waiting to discharge, or rerouted through opaque ship-to-ship transfers. Read narrowly as unsold floating storage, the figure is probably inflated. Even so, the signal is familiar: bottlenecks are rising, and bottlenecks usually mean heavier discounts and weaker fiscal intake.

Corporate results reinforce the picture. Rosneft’s weak third quarter, with a steep year-on-year profit decline and lower revenue, fits an environment of poorer pricing, wider discounts, and higher financial and operational costs. Since Russia’s biggest producers remain a key transmission belt between export earnings and the state’s coffers, weaker profitability in the sector is not merely a corporate problem. It is a budget problem.

The human economy is flashing warning lights as well. Wage disputes, such as the reported stoppage of pay at a major mining construction site in the Urals, capture the kind of localized stress that tends to appear when contractors’ cash flow tightens or payments are delayed. Rising wage arrears, even when small in macro terms, are rarely comforting.

If these trends persist into 2026, Russia’s choices narrow. It can finance larger deficits through domestic borrowing or reserves, lean harder on non-oil taxes and quasi-taxes, or compress civilian spending through delays and under-execution, shifting burdens onto regions and state firms. A deficit nearer RUB 7.4 trillion [$92.2 billion] is plausible if oil stays low and spending remains elevated, but the final figure will depend on late-year budget execution and what happens to oil prices and the ruble in December.

Rutte warns NATO to prepare for a wider war

NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte delivered remarks in Berlin on 11 December 2025 at “MSC in Berlin,” a Munich Security Conference event hosted at the Bavarian State Representation (Bayerische Landesvertretung). He then took part in a discussion with Germany’s foreign minister, Johann Wadephul, moderated by Wolfgang Ischinger.

The message was designed to bind several strands of the war into a single warning. The front line in Ukraine, Europe’s industrial readiness, and China’s enabling role, Rutte argued, are not separate stories. They form one strategic problem.

The claim that “we are Russia’s next target” was aimed at NATO publics as much as at Moscow. Rutte’s premise is that Europe has drifted into peacetime habits while Russia has built a wartime machine, and that complacency can invite probing. That is why he paired the threat framing with a call for a “wartime mindset” and for Ukraine to get what it needs to defend itself. In this telling, backing Ukraine is not charity. It is a cheaper way to reduce the risk of a larger war later.

The casualty figure, about 1,200 Russian troops a day killed or wounded, served a similar purpose. If the Kremlin is willing to absorb enormous losses for incremental gains in Ukraine, Rutte implied, it may also be willing to run serious risks elsewhere. The logic is escalation by tolerance: a state that accepts high costs can become more dangerous, not less. As with all wartime statistics, the number should be treated as an official claim rather than something independently verifiable in real time.

Rutte’s point about China was framed as supply chains as strategy. By arguing that roughly 80% of critical components in Russian drones and missiles are made in China, he suggested that sanctions and battlefield attrition are only part of the equation. Russia’s ability to sustain long-range strikes also depends on access to dual-use inputs and manufacturing capacity. Europe’s security problem, in other words, is not only on the eastern flank. It also runs through export controls, enforcement, and the reality that global electronics supply chains can become a wartime lifeline.

Finally, the warning that Russia could be ready to use military force against NATO within five years was meant to alter planning assumptions. Leaders often speak in vague horizons; Rutte put a number on it to justify decisions that are politically painful in peacetime: higher defense spending, faster procurement, larger stockpiles, and more capacity to manufacture munitions, air defenses, drones, and spare parts at scale. The subtext was clear: deterrence is not a slogan. It is an industrial and fiscal posture.

Move fast and break things

The Fed renews regional leadership (but not the top job)

The Federal Reserve has announced a round of leadership renewals as terms expire across the system. This is about the 12 regional Reserve Banks, not the top job in Washington.

After reviews conducted by each Reserve Bank’s board of directors, the Federal Reserve Board voted unanimously to reappoint the Reserve Bank presidents and their first vice presidents, with new terms beginning on 1 March 2026. The main exception is Atlanta, where the sitting president has said he will retire, so an acting leader will serve while a successor is chosen.

The decision matters because Reserve Bank presidents help run the Federal Reserve System and, on a rotating basis, vote on monetary policy at the Federal Open Market Committee. It signals continuity in regional leadership at a moment of intense scrutiny.

It does not cover the Fed Chair. Jerome Powell’s term as Chair ends on 15 May 2026, while his separate term as a member of the Board of Governors runs until 31 January 2028. He therefore already holds a Board seat. The only open question is whether he would remain as a Governor after stepping down as Chair, which is permitted even though past Chairs have often left around the same time.

Indiana Republicans balk at a Trump redistricting push

Indiana’s Republican-controlled Senate voted 31–19 to kill a mid-decade redistricting plan that would likely have shifted the state’s U.S. House map from 7–2 Republican to 9–0 Republican in 2026. The defeat, driven by a sizable GOP breakaway bloc joining Democrats, is a setback for President Donald Trump’s push to use mid-cycle remaps in red states to bank seats ahead of the 2026 midterms, with critics warning it looked like an overreach and a legal and political risk.

Instability from Sahel to Horn of Africa amid state fragility, Russian interference, & Islamist insurgencies

Uvira’s fall raises the risk of a wider war in Central Africa

The reported capture of Uvira by the Rwanda-backed M23 movement, with alleged support from Rwanda’s army, matters because it changes the geometry of the war in eastern Congo.

Uvira sits on Lake Tanganyika near the Burundi border and has served as a logistical and administrative hinge for state authority in South Kivu. Losing it is more than a tactical reverse. It weakens Kinshasa’s ability to claim effective control over the province and gives M23 a platform to consolidate along the lakeshore corridor and pressure remaining government positions.

For Burundi, the fall of Uvira is an acute national-security alarm. The town lies close to Burundi’s main population and economic center across the lake, and any spillover can arrive quickly through refugee flows, militia infiltration, or cross-border incidents that are easy to misread and hard to contain. That is how a Congolese battle risks becoming a regional crisis, especially if Burundian forces reinforce the border or are drawn into clashes around crossings and lakeside routes.

The timing is politically brutal.

The escalation comes days after a Washington-brokered peace framework involving the leaders of the Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda, with President Donald Trump acting as convener.

Europe's center of gravity shifts east, politics moves right, hostility to migrants from the south rises, as ties with the U.S. fray, and fear of Russia increases

Bulgaria’s budget revolt turns into a legitimacy crisis as government resigns

Bulgaria’s protests have become a classic case of how a technocratic trigger can unlock a deeper political revolt.

What began as anger over the government’s 2026 budget, drafted in euros ahead of Bulgaria’s planned euro adoption on 1 January 2026, quickly broadened into a nationwide demand for clean government and a functioning rule of law.

The budget’s symbolism mattered, but so did its substance. Measures seen as squeezing households while insiders remained protected helped turn a fiscal dispute into a legitimacy crisis. As crowds swelled in Sofia and across other cities, and as diaspora rallies appeared elsewhere in Europe, the message shifted from “change the budget” to “change the system,” with corruption and impunity as the central targets.

The political fallout has been swift. The prime minister announced the resignation of his government after weeks of sustained demonstrations, leaving Bulgaria facing either a new parliamentary coalition or another round of elections. It also places the country’s euro-entry timetable under an unusually public stress test.

Under threat worldwide

Congress pushes a fast-moving package of online-safety bills

A package of 18 bills marketed as online safety measures for children is moving quickly through Congress. The “18 laws today” alarm reflects a real legislative burst. On 11 December 2025, a House Energy and Commerce subcommittee advanced 18 online-safety proposals aimed largely at children and teens, sending them to the full committee.

The package mixes very different ideas, which critics group as censorship or surveillance. Their main concern is that proposals pushing age verification, expanding parental-control requirements, and imposing new compliance duties on platforms can encourage identity checks, increase the collection of sensitive data, and lead companies to block lawful content to reduce liability.

It is also worth separating threads that are often conflated online. Changes to Section 230 (which guarantees that online platforms are not regarded as publishers) are a related but distinct fight and are not necessarily part of the same 18-bill markup list. Procedurally, moving an entire package from subcommittee to enactment in a week is difficult, but a subset could be fast-tracked if House leadership prioritizes it. That is why advocates on both sides are watching the full committee schedule closely.

Thailand goes to the polls as a border war expands

Thailand’s decision to dissolve parliament in the middle of a live border conflict with Cambodia is a reminder that, in Bangkok, political time often runs faster than strategic time.

Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul announced the move in the language of democratic renewal, “returning power to the people,” and sought royal approval to dissolve the House of Representatives. Once the dissolution takes effect, the constitution starts the clock: a general election must be held within 45 to 60 days, pointing to a vote in late January or early February 2026.

The immediate trigger was not the fighting at the frontier, but a breakdown in parliamentary arithmetic. The opposition People’s Party, the largest bloc, had been preparing a no-confidence motion after accusing Anutin’s Bhumjaithai Party of reneging on a political understanding tied to constitutional reform, including the sequencing of amendments and a referendum process. Rather than face a confidence vote with a minority government and a fraying deal, Anutin opted for dissolution, the standard escape hatch when the chamber becomes ungovernable.

The timing is sharp because it coincides with a serious escalation along the Cambodian border, with clashes and displacement reported. Anutin has insisted that dissolving parliament will not affect military operations. In a narrow legal sense, that is plausible. Thailand will be run by a caretaker administration, but the security apparatus and chain of command will still function.

There is also an electoral logic. Wartime politics can reward incumbents if voters rally around the flag, and the move may reflect a bet that heightened nationalism strengthens Anutin’s hand against the People’s Party.

Even if elections proceed smoothly, they may not resolve Thailand’s chronic problem: fragmentation. Recent patterns suggest no party is likely to win a clear majority, pushing politics back toward coalition bargaining, institutional friction, and the familiar cycle of governments formed under pressure and destabilized by courts, street politics, or internal splits. In that sense, dissolution is less a reset than a reshuffle, conducted while the country is also managing an external crisis.

Center of Gravity sign up link: https://www.namea-group.com/the-daily-brief