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In place of our normal daily geopolitical news update (resuming 5 January), please find below our assessment of yesterday’s Ukraine peace talks at Mar-a-Lago.
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Mar-a-Lago talks: Pragmatic attempts to find a solution via security guarantees
Mar-a-Lago is built for spectacle: gilded interiors, choreographed arrivals, a sense that politics is a branch of entertainment and diplomacy an extension of branding.
Which is why the optics of President Donald Trump hosting President Volodymyr Zelensky at Mar-a-Lago on 28 December 2025 mattered almost as much as whatever was said behind closed doors. The setting telegraphed the Trump worldview. In other words: deals are personal and leverage is psychological.
For Zelensky, showing up and keeping the meeting productive was not only about a peace process; it was about staying inside the only room that currently counts.
The public takeaway, at least on paper, is clear: Zelensky emerged saying the U.S. had agreed to “strong” security guarantees for Ukraine, structured over 15 years, with an option to extend, and with a promise that the arrangement would be put to a vote in the U.S. Congress.
That is not a ceasefire, not a treaty, and not an end to the war.
But in the logic of this negotiation, it is the closest thing to a definable deliverable: a political commitment that tries to answer the core question: what stops Russia from coming back once there is a peace deal?
Zelensky’s own readout the following day leaned into three achievements.
First, he said Trump confirmed security guarantees “developed up to this point” by negotiating teams and confirmed the intent to seek congressional approval.
Second, he said they discussed a postwar recovery package designed to pull American business into Ukraine’s reconstruction and to explore a free-trade agreement.
Third, he framed the talks as nearing another milestone tied to an evolving “20-point plan,” suggesting that much of the architecture is sketched, even if the hardest parts of the deal are unfinished.
Those are the headlines. The subtext is where the meeting did its real work.
Zelensky’s performance, and why it mattered
In Trump’s Washington, Ukraine’s most valuable asset is not sympathy; rather, it is credibility. Zelensky’s objective at Mar-a-Lago was to look like the adult in the room: reasonable, flexible on process, firm on sovereignty, and grateful without appearing dependent.
That is why his readout stressed mechanics, such as terms, duration, and a congressional vote, rather than emotion. He was speaking over the heads of diplomats to multiple audiences at once: skeptical U.S. lawmakers, Trump’s political coalition, European partners watching nervously, and Moscow, which calibrates its maximalism to the mood in the West.
In that sense, one of the clearest “behind-the-scenes” outcomes is not a clause in a document but the impression left behind: Ukraine, at least in this episode, managed to appear constructive in a process that Trump wants to own.
The value of that is defensive. It makes it harder, later, for Kyiv to be cast as the obstacle if negotiations stall.
It also helps Zelensky preserve a functional relationship with an administration that, by temperament, prizes loyalty and punishes public friction.
Trump, for his part, signaled momentum without claiming closure. Major elements of a broader peace framework appear to be under discussion, while the thorny issues remain unclear. Indeed, the most important elements remain, especially territory and the future governance of contested regions. The effect is classic Trump: the deal is always nearly done, until it isn’t, and the possibility of collapse is part of the pressure campaign.
The 15-year security guarantee: big promise, narrow runway
A 15-year security guarantee is simultaneously substantial and revealing. Substantial, because it is long enough to cover multiple U.S. election cycles and, if written with real teeth, could deter opportunistic aggression. Revealing, because it hints at the constraints Trump faces.
If Zelensky truly did secure a promise of a congressional vote, that is not a procedural footnote, it is the whole point. In the U.S. system, durability comes from legislation, not press conferences.
A congressional imprimatur would also signal to Moscow that this is not merely a presidential mood but a broader institutional stake in Ukraine’s security.
At the same time, routing guarantees through Congress invites the messiness of U.S. politics: bargaining, compromises, conditions, timelines, and the risk that the strongest language gets watered down to what can actually pass.
The 15-year horizon also explains Zelensky’s push for something longer, 30, 40, or even 50 years, which Zelensky has framed as a “historic” legacy decision for Trump. That pitch was not accidental flattery. It was a targeted appeal Trump, who wishes to see himself not as a caretaker but as a dealmaker who rewrites history.
Whether Trump will truly consider a multi-decade guarantee is another question. A longer term increases deterrence, but it also increases political and fiscal exposure, and it invites critics to call it an open-ended commitment under a different name. For Trump, 15 years may be the sweet spot: long enough to look serious, short enough to look finite.
Russia’s counter-offer: surrender dressed as ceasefire
If the U.S.-Ukraine side is trying to build a bridge, the Kremlin is trying to redefine the river.
Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said today that Russia was not prepared to accept a ceasefire unless Ukraine withdrew its troops from the parts of Donbas it still controls. This is not a negotiating position so much as a demand for unilateral capitulation in a region Ukraine is defending on its own sovereign territory.
Kyiv treats it as a nonstarter for the same reason any state would: withdrawing under fire from territories it controls, without a settlement that guarantees sovereignty, simply creates the conditions for further loss.
The clarity of Peskov’s statement performs two functions for Moscow. First, it reassures domestic audiences that Russia is not trading battlefield gains for signatures. Second, it tests whether Trump’s desire for a deal will translate into pressure on Kyiv to “be realistic.” If Ukraine refuses, and it almost certainly will, Russia can claim it was the willing party, while continuing military operations.
This is the core asymmetry in the current moment.
Trump wants an agreement he can sell as proof of competence.
Zelensky needs an agreement that prevents a repeat invasion.
Russia wants an agreement that ratifies what it holds, while keeping open the option of taking more later.
Those goals overlap only if security guarantees become strong enough to compensate for what Ukraine would otherwise refuse to concede, and if Russia believes the guarantees are credible enough to change its calculus.
The real bottleneck: territory and the nuclear plant
The eastern Donbas region remains unresolved, alongside questions linked to the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant. These are not “details.” They are the war.
Territory is identity, legitimacy, and survival for Ukraine’s leadership. For Russia, territory is the prize that justifies the costs already paid. Any formula that appears to formalize Russian control will face fierce resistance in Ukraine, while any formula that implies Russia must retreat will be treated in Moscow as defeat.
That is why proposals drift toward process solutions: demilitarized zones, ceasefire timelines, monitoring arrangements, referendums, and phased implementation. These mechanisms can delay the hardest verdicts, but diplomatic history shows us that they rarely resolve the underlying issues.
The nuclear plant adds another layer: it is a strategic asset and a symbolic one, and it raises safety and governance issues that are difficult to finesse with vague language. When negotiators argue about how a nuclear facility “will operate,” they are really arguing about sovereignty, security control, and the credibility of any demilitarized arrangement nearby.
Why Ukraine’s reasonableness is a strategic weapon
Ukraine’s effort to appear reasonable is not mere public relations. It is a tool of strategic leverage.
In any negotiation mediated by a third party with its own agenda, the side that appears constructive tends to inherit the mediator’s patience. The side that appears maximalist tends to inherit the blame. Zelensky understands that Trump’s tolerance for bargaining is limited, and his interest in prolonged stalemate is even more limited. So Ukraine’s strategy is to be flexible on sequencing and framing while being rigid on fundamentals. Thus, if things break, Moscow looks like the spoiler.
That strategy also aims at Europe. U.S. security guarantees, even if strong, will not substitute for European financing, weapons production, and political backing. Zelensky’s readout signaled not only what he “won” from Trump but that Ukraine is behaving like a state preparing for reconstruction and trade, not permanent mobilization. That is meant to keep European capitals invested in Ukraine’s future, not only its present suffering.
The sanctions subplot for Russia
One of the important aspects of this moment is that Russia’s performance of engagement with the process buys it time. It could slow the tightening of sanctions pressure, complicate the political case for new sanctions, and create openings for selective relief under the banner of “keeping channels open” or protecting sensitive sectors, such as the nuclear industry.
What Trump gets, what Zelensky gets, what Putin gets
Ultimately, the meeting reads like three overlapping campaigns.
Trump’s campaign is for a headline. He wants to say he moved the world closer to peace, and he wants the peace to be a branded product: “my deal.” A 15-year security guarantee, especially one headed to Congress, is a concrete artifact that makes the claim harder to dismiss.
Zelensky’s campaign is for durability. His fear is not merely losing territory, he fears ending the war in a way that makes the next war inevitable. A time-bound guarantee, backed by U.S. politics, is his attempt to turn Trump’s desire for a signature moment into an insurance policy for Ukraine’s statehood.
Putin’s campaign is for ratification without responsibility. Russia wants an outcome that locks in gains, minimizes costs, and leaves room to coerce Ukraine again when conditions improve. Demanding a Ukrainian withdrawal from Donbas as a precondition for ceasefire is a way of keeping the bar high while appearing “open” to peace.
The risk for Ukraine is that Trump, faced with Russia’s rigidity, may decide that “peace” requires pressuring the more dependent party. The counter-risk for Trump is that a weak deal collapses later, turning his “historic” moment into a delayed failure. The risk for Russia is that if it overplays its hand, the process could harden Western guarantees and increase long-term deterrence, which is precisely the outcome the Kremlin wants to avoid.
The likely next phase
If the 20-point framework is indeed close to completion, the next phase will be less glamorous than Mar-a-Lago and far more consequential: drafting, verification mechanisms, politics, and the slow grind of aligning allied positions.
If Congress is indeed asked to vote on the security guarantee, every word will be scrutinized: what triggers U.S. action, what constitutes a violation, what resources are pre-committed, and what role Europe is expected to play.
Meanwhile, Russia will keep testing the boundaries, militarily and diplomatically, while insisting that Ukraine must move first. In that environment, the Mar-a-Lago meeting may be remembered less for what it finalized than for what it signaled: that Ukraine is adapting to Trump’s operating system, and that the U.S. is exploring guarantees as the means that might bring about a settlement … when territory cannot.
What Zelensky seems to understand, perhaps better than many of Trump’s critics, is that Trump does not like being “convinced.” He likes being the one who decides.
Zelensky’s Mar-a-Lago posture was designed to let Trump control the narrative, while quietly locking in the one thing Ukraine needs most: a credible promise that the war, once it ends, does not simply reset.
Known Unknowns: The impact of U.S. tariffs on international trade & especially the U.S. bond market. Whether the U.S. and Iran will restart nuke talks, or whether another round of conflict will occur between the US, Israel, Iran, and their respective allies. Relations of new Syrian government with Israel, international community & ability to maintain stability inside Syria. China’s triggers for military action against Taiwan. U.S. and allied responses to China’s ‘grey zone’ warfare in the South China Sea and north Asia. Ukraine’s ability to withstand Russia’s war of attrition. The potential for the jihadist insurgency in Africa’s Sahel region to consolidate and spread.
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What happened today:
1170 - Thomas Becket is assassinated in Canterbury Cathedral. 1835 - Treaty of New Echota is signed, ceding Cherokee lands east of the Mississippi to the United States. 1845 - Texas is annexed and admitted as the 28th U.S. state. 1890 - Wounded Knee Massacre: U.S. troops kill hundreds of Lakota at Pine Ridge. 1937 - Ireland’s 1937 constitution comes into force, replacing the Irish Free State with Ireland. 1940 - The Luftwaffe’s raid triggers the “Second Great Fire of London” during the Blitz. 1989 - Václav Havel is elected president of Czechoslovakia. 2023 - South Africa files a genocide case against Israel at the International Court of Justice.
