2026/01/02 - Iran Protests

In place of our normal daily geopolitical news update (resuming 5 January), please find below our assessment of Iran’s current round of protests

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Iran Protests: Situation overview 2 Jan 2026

Iran is experiencing its most serious wave of unrest since the 2022 “Woman, Life, Freedom” protests, triggered this time by an acute economic shock (rapid currency depreciation and sustained high inflation) then broadening into explicitly anti-regime demonstrations and localized violent clashes. The protest cycle appears to have started with shopkeepers and merchants (notably around Tehran’s commercial districts and bazaars) and rapidly widened to include students and other urban constituencies, with parallel flare-ups in a mix of provincial cities and smaller towns. 

The state response is following a familiar pattern of coercion plus selective messaging about “dialogue,” with significant variance in violence by locality. 

What is happening on the ground

Trigger and spread

Media reporting describes protests beginning with shopkeepers reacting to a sharp currency slide and rising prices, with closures and demonstrations expanding to students and spreading across multiple provinces. The movement thus began as a shopkeeper and merchant-led shock that rapidly “jumped” cities and social groups. 

The currency devaluation

Casualties and escalation 

Death toll claims differ across outlets and between state-linked media and rights groups, but the direction is clear: clashes have turned deadly in several locales. 

Fars News Agency, which is closely linked to the government, is reporting three killed and 17 injured during an attack on a police station in Lorestan province. Other media reporting claims other deaths in places including Lordegan and Isfahan province. Mainstream Western media outlets are reporting at least seven killed overall, though these figures are impossible to confirm at this time. Importantly, there is a cohesive message across mainstream media and social media emphasizing that the intensifying unrest has spread to rural provinces and smaller cities.

Government approach: dual-track containment

Authorities are signaling a mix of limited outreach and heavy security measures. There is talk by the government of engaging trade representatives, alongside arrests and an assertive security posture. There appears to be extensive security deployments and crackdowns at protest sites, with slogans in multiple cities targeting the Supreme Leader and calling for regime change. In some locations protestors also seem to have been calling for the return of the Iranian monarchy, though these reports are probably being blown out of proportion by exiled pro-monarchy Iranians.

Information environment (including X/Twitter)

X social media is functioning as a primary distribution channel for protest videos, strike calls, and casualty claims, but verification is uneven and partisan amplification is common (both opposition-linked and state-adjacent narratives). 

One practical indicator of state response is connectivity disruption: open-source monitoring and posts citing Cloudflare data indicate detectable drops in connectivity and traffic during the protest period, consistent with Iran’s prior use of throttling and shutdown tactics. 

Ethnic and separatist dimensions (Kurds, Azeris etc)

Kurdish regions: high participation, high repression risk

There is credible reporting of significant protest and strike activity in Kurdish-populated areas and adjacent provinces. The Norway based, Kurd-aligned, Hengaw Organization for Human Rights lists coordinated strike participation across numerous cities in Kurdistan Province (e.g., Sanandaj, Saqqez, Marivan) as well as West Azerbaijan and Ilam, areas with Kurdish communities and a long history of center-periphery tension. 

Separate reporting focused on Mahabad (a symbolic Kurdish city) indicates heightened security deployments and warnings of a crackdown, with claims, most unverifiable, of reinforcements being moved in and live fire used in nearby towns. This is consistent with a broader trend since mid-2025: There was a significant post–Iran–Israel conflict crackdown featuring arrests and executions and intensified security presence “particularly in the Kurdish regions,” driven by regime fears of infiltration and ethnic separatism. 

Does this equal “separatism”? 

Not necessarily. Kurdish participation can be high for reasons that overlap with nationwide grievances (economy, repression), but Kurdish areas also have organized political currents with explicit national-rights agendas. The major Iranian Kurdish parties differ in end-states: many call for Kurdish national rights within a federal or secular Iran, while at least some currents advocate independence. 

Assessment: Kurdish-populated areas are a likely epicenter for intensified repression and potential armed incidents, but the available reporting still points to this protest wave being primarily a nationwide economic and political revolt rather than a Kurdish secession campaign. 

Forward assessment

The most probable near-term trajectory is a familiar Iranian cycle: 

This makes rapid regime collapse unlikely without (a) sustained nationwide labor strikes in critical sectors (energy, transport, heavy industry), (b) elite fragmentation, or (c) a major catalytic event (large massacre, high-profile defection, or sudden economic rupture).

Scenarios (next 4–12 weeks)

Early-warning indicators to watch

Bottom line: This wave is best understood as an economically triggered, politically accelerating national protest cycle with meaningful Kurdish-region participation and a high likelihood of the regime securitizing Kurdish activism as “separatism.” 

The regime likely has the tools to mitigate the effects of the protests, but only if it uses them carefully, and without exacerbating public anger.  

It’s important to note that the protests are spontaneous and leaderless. It’s hard to overthrow a regime without an organization to support the effort. However, it is also possible that a level of organization might evolve if the protests become self-sustaining, especially in Kurdish areas (which have a long history of separatists aspirations).

Another known unknown is the possible impact of outside players, like the United States and Israel. That is something we will be watching closely in coming days.

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