What you need to know

Focus of war turns to Strait of Hormuz

The U.S.-Israeli war against Iran remains an intensifying coercive air-and-maritime campaign. Washington and Israel still hold the military initiative, and the campaign appears focused on degrading Iran’s missile forces, its capacity to disrupt maritime traffic, and the infrastructure that sustains both.

At the Pentagon on 10 March, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth said that day would be the most intense of U.S. strikes inside Iran so far, while General Dan Caine, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said Iran was fighting hard but had not proved more formidable than U.S. planners expected. The Pentagon also said the United States had struck more than 5,000 targets since 28 February and destroyed or damaged more than 50 Iranian naval vessels.

The target list inside Iran has expanded. What began as a campaign aimed chiefly at strategic and military capabilities now plainly includes parts of the energy system judged useful to Iran’s war effort. Israeli strikes on the night of 7-8 March hit multiple fuel depots and refineries across Tehran and neighboring Alborz province. Israeli officials said those sites supported Iran’s war effort, including the production or storage of ballistic-missile propellant. The result was not only physical damage but also major secondary effects, with thick toxic plumes and acid rain reported over parts of Tehran.

Iran, however, is damaged but a long way from defeated. American officials say Iranian strike volumes have fallen sharply since the opening days of the war, which suggests that the joint campaign is eroding weapons stocks, launchers, and operational tempo. Even so, Tehran retains enough capability to keep the war regionally dangerous. Iranian authorities are also tightening internal repression, which points to a regime under heavy pressure but still able to retaliate and widen the conflict across the region.

The regional theater has widened beyond Iran and Israel. Lebanon remains an active front, while Gulf infrastructure, U.S. positions, and maritime traffic have all been drawn into the same battlespace. This matters because it shows the war is no longer a contained bilateral exchange. It is now a multi-front regional contest.

The Strait of Hormuz has become one of the central tests of the war. In practical terms, the strait is not securely open for normal commerce, even if it has not been formally and legally sealed. Traffic remains far below normal levels, and shipping risks remain high. At the same time, the disruption has not been total or uniform. 

That is an important reminder that the strait is not simply closed. It is selectively passable, and Iran appears able to move at least part of its own crude-export flow, particularly to its main buyer, even as broader commercial shipping remains badly disrupted.

Overnight maritime incidents reinforced that picture. Three commercial vessels have been affected in separate maritime incidents near Oman and the UAE today. The Thai-flagged bulk carrier Mayruree Naree was evacuated off Oman after a fire on board was put out. The Japan-flagged container ship One Majesty suffered minor damage from an unidentified projectile northwest of Ras Al Khaimah, while Star Gwyneth was also struck by an unknown projectile northwest of Dubai.

This brings the argument to the question of U.S. ability and willingness to protect shipping. Politically, Washington appears willing in principle. President Donald Trump has said the U.S. would escort tankers if necessary and has floated the idea of the U.S. providing insurance. Caine said the military was examining a range of options for potential escorts. 

In other words, Washington wants to preserve the option and project confidence, but it is not prepared, for now, to assume the immediate risk of routine convoy protection.

That caution reflects the nature of the battlespace. Hormuz is narrow, crowded, and highly favorable to Iranian asymmetric tactics. Mines, drones, and other low-cost systems can still threaten traffic even after U.S. attacks on Iranian mine-laying assets. The Pentagon’s current approach appears to be to shape the environment first by suppressing the threat network, then to consider selective escorted transits if ordered.

Iran may no longer be able to generate the same volume of missile and drone fire that it produced in the opening phase of the war, but it does not need to do so in order to disrupt international trade. 

If Tehran can keep Hormuz risky, keep insurance costs elevated, and constrain Gulf exports for most shippers while still moving some of its own crude to China, it can continue to impose costs on the U.S., its regional partners, and global markets while preserving a measure of economic lifeline for itself. That is why the maritime front matters so much. Iran’s most effective remaining lever may lie not in direct battlefield reversal, but in prolonged disruption combined with selective commercial access.

So the state of the war today is this: the U.S. and Israel are still advancing militarily in the air and at sea; Iran’s offensive capacity has been significantly degraded; but Tehran retains enough capability to keep the conflict regionally expansive, economically painful, and politically difficult to close. 

The most likely near-term trajectory is continued high-intensity strikes on Iranian military and dual-use targets, more pressure on maritime routes and Gulf infrastructure, and no quick restoration of normal shipping through the Strait of Hormuz. Washington is willing in principle to protect shipping, and it has the power to secure limited, high-priority passages, but it is not acting as though it can safely restore routine commercial traffic across the strait.

The ultimate complex system

Markets brace for an inflation shock as oil volatility clouds the global outlook

The U.S. and global economy entered the day under renewed pressure from energy-market volatility, as investors weighed the inflationary consequences of the Iran crisis against indications that policymakers may try to soften the blow.

Markets are especially focused on U.S. consumer-price data due today, which will provide a snapshot of inflation before the latest rise in oil prices feeds more fully into the numbers.

Oil remained the main driver of market sentiment. Crude prices, after rising sharply earlier in the week, eased following reports that the International Energy Agency was considering an exceptionally large release from strategic reserves. That helped calm immediate fears of a prolonged price spike, though traders remained wary amid continuing uncertainty over supply risks and the possibility of further disruption.

In the U.S., concerns extended beyond energy. Treasury markets remained unsettled, with investors alert to inflation risks, rising debt issuance, and geopolitical instability. Demand for dollars in funding markets also strengthened markedly, suggesting that global investors were still seeking safety and liquidity.

Elsewhere, central banks faced diverging pressures. In Europe, policymakers indicated that they were in no hurry to change interest rates, though they also made clear that a sustained increase in fuel costs could alter the inflation outlook. In Britain, lower oil prices briefly eased pressure on sterling and on expectations for interest rates. In Asia, however, economists increasingly expected the Reserve Bank of Australia to tighten policy again as inflation remained persistent.

The world economy is confronting a familiar problem: a fresh energy shock arriving before inflation had been fully brought to heel and before governments had rebuilt much of a fiscal buffer.

It’s the U.S. vs China, everyone needs to pick a side

Washington may loosen Russian oil curbs to calm markets

The Trump administration is weighing steps to ease pressure on global oil markets by relaxing parts of its sanctions regime on Russian oil, with India appearing to be the most likely beneficiary of any targeted relief.

U.S. officials had been considering an announcement as early as Monday that could allow countries such as India to continue buying Russian crude without facing U.S. penalties or tariff pressure. The deliberations come as Washington seeks to contain the rise in oil prices caused by the expanding war with Iran and fears of broader disruption to Middle Eastern energy supplies.

A narrower step has already been taken. On 5 March, the U.S. Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control issued General License 133, authorizing the delivery and sale to India of Russian-origin crude and petroleum products that had already been loaded on vessels by that date. The measure indicates that Washington has already acted, at least in a limited and time-bound way, to preserve some Indian access to Russian oil.

The rationale is straightforward. Russian crude remains one of the few large alternative supplies available quickly enough to reduce the risk of a more severe global price shock. India has become one of the biggest buyers of discounted Russian oil since the Western sanctions campaign intensified after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, making any carve-out for Indian imports commercially important rather than merely symbolic.

No broader rollback of Russian oil sanctions has been formally confirmed in the material available so far. The Treasury has published the India-related license, but wider relief remained under consideration rather than having been publicly finalized.

Any such move would carry diplomatic costs. European officials have already warned that easing pressure on Russian oil would help Moscow financially and could weaken Western support for Ukraine. The European Commission has urged Washington to continue enforcing the G7 price cap on Russian oil.

Russia Ukraine war update

Russia and Ukraine both reported continued fighting and new claimed gains on the battlefield. 

President Vladimir Putin said Russian forces had extended their gains in the Donbas and claimed that Ukraine now held only 15% to 17% of the region, though that claim could not be independently verified. 

On the Ukrainian side, officials said their forces had broken through Russian defenses in the southeast and advanced by more than 10 km (6.2 miles) in one sector, while the Institute for the Study of War said recent Ukrainian counterattacks were disrupting Russia’s plans for spring and summer 2026.

In Donetsk Oblast, one of the clearest reported developments was a Russian strike on Sloviansk, a frontline city. Donetsk regional governor Vadym Filashkin said three guided bombs hit the city center, killing four people and injuring 16, including a 14-year-old girl.

On the Sumy and Kursk axes, the most widely reported developments over the past 24 hours were more limited. Major wire-service reporting in that period did not confirm a significant new territorial shift there.

Inside Russia, Ukraine launched a missile strike on Bryansk on 10 March. Governor Alexander Bogomaz said that at least six civilians were killed and 37 injured. President Volodymyr Zelensky said the target was a plant producing missile-control systems, and Ukraine’s military said British-made Storm Shadow missiles had been used against the Kremniy El microchip factory in Bryansk.

As for Russian air attacks inside Ukraine, Ukraine’s air force said Russia launched 137 drones overnight and that 122 were shot down or electronically suppressed. Ukrainska Pravda, citing the Ukrainian Air Force, said 12 UAV strikes were recorded at 10 locations, with falling debris reported at 10 others. Overnight drone strikes on three Ukrainian cities wounded at least 17 people, including two children.

As for the Russian economy, the main picture at present is that fiscal pressure is rising even though Moscow still retains some buffers. Russia’s economy has slowed sharply last year after high interest rates were used to curb inflation; for 2026, the government forecasts growth of 1.3%, while the central bank forecasts 0.5% to 1.5%, while January energy revenues fell to their lowest level since July 2020. Finance Minister Anton Siluanov said Russia would divert more oil revenues into the reserve fund and cut spending, reflecting the pressure.

U.S.-China tensions stay focused on trade, fentanyl, and Washington politics

U.S.-China relations are currently centered on trade frictions, narcotics diplomacy, and a renewed political debate in Washington over America’s China policy.

In China’s export hubs, manufacturers have rushed to take advantage of a recent U.S. tariff reprieve, though many firms remain doubtful that the easing will endure and are continuing to prepare for prolonged trade uncertainty.

At the same time, U.S. and Chinese officials clashed publicly in Vienna at a global drugs meeting. American officials accused China of failing to do enough to curb exports of precursor chemicals used in fentanyl production, and linked the issue to tariff policy. Chinese officials rejected the accusations and criticized the use of tariffs and sanctions to address narcotics concerns.

In Washington, Senate Democrats released a report arguing that President Donald Trump’s approach to China risks weakening America’s position in long-term competition with Beijing. The report criticized the administration’s handling of trade, alliances, diplomacy, and technology policy ahead of an expected Trump-Xi summit.

Effectively, the U.S.-China relationship remains dominated by disputes over trade, supply chains, fentanyl enforcement, and the broader argument over how Washington should manage strategic competition with Beijing.

The new Monroe Doctrine & the Trump Corollary 

Venezuela opens oil and mining sectors to foreign firms

Chevron and Shell are nearing what could become the first major new oil-production deals in Venezuela since the U.S. captured Nicolas Maduro in January 2026.

The negotiations form part of a broader reopening of Venezuela’s energy sector under U.S.-backed reforms that grant foreign firms greater operating autonomy, even when they remain minority partners of PDVSA, the state oil company.

Chevron is reportedly close to finalizing terms to expand the Petropiar project in the Orinoco Belt, specifically through development of the Ayacucho 8 area. If completed, the expansion would raise Chevron’s heavy-oil output and could make the company the largest private producer in that region.

Shell, meanwhile, has signed preliminary agreements linked to the Carito and Pirital fields in North Monagas, which contain light crude and natural gas. Shell has already signed several oil-and-gas agreements with Venezuela, including work tied to the long-delayed Dragon offshore gas project, with exports to Trinidad targeted for the third quarter of 2027. Other firms, including Repsol and Maurel & Prom, are also seeking to expand their positions.

Venezuela’s National Assembly also approved a new mining bill in an initial vote on 9 March. The draft would open the sector to domestic and foreign firms in gold, diamonds, and rare earths, repeal a 1999 law, and extend concession terms from 20 years to 30 years.  

U.S. Interior Secretary Doug Burgum, during a visit to Venezuela a few days ago, expressed optimism about the proposed mining law and said it would provide security guarantees and new licenses to attract foreign investment. The government has presented the mining changes as a follow-on measure to the hydrocarbons reform passed in January.

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