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Iran war enters a grinding second phase as U.S. and Israeli strikes widen

After 13 days of war, the U.S. and Israel are still striking deep inside Iran, but the campaign is moving from shock to sustained attrition. Israeli forces said today that they had hit more than 200 targets in western and central Iran over the previous day, including ballistic-missile launchers, air-defense systems, and weapons-production sites. Explosions were reported around Karaj, west of Tehran, while Iran responded with another overnight barrage of missiles and drones.

Washington says its campaign, Operation Epic Fury, has already hit more than 5,000 targets, while damaging or destroying 50 Iranian vessels. The White House and the Pentagon have used those figures to argue that the U.S.-Israeli campaign has significantly reduced Iran’s ability to threaten regional shipping, launch long-range missiles, and sustain military operations. Earlier this week, the Pentagon described 10 March as the most intense day of airstrikes so far.

That is the coalition’s case for progress: the target list has grown, the tempo remains high, and U.S. officials say Iran is fighting hard but no more effectively than planners had expected. At the same time, Iranian retaliation has plainly continued. On 10 March Iran fired at U.S. facilities in Qatar and Iraq, followed by drone attacks aimed at Al Dhafra in the UAE and Juffair in Bahrain. But the situation today, following Iran’s latest overnight and morning barrage casts doubt on earlier U.S. and Israeli claims that much of Tehran’s long-range strike capacity had already been knocked out.

The clearest military assessment, then, is mixed. The U.S. and Israel appear to have won air superiority over large parts of Iran and are steadily destroying launchers, air defenses, and military infrastructure. But they have not eliminated Iran’s capacity to retaliate across the region, nor have they forced a political rupture in Tehran. Our assessment is that Iran’s leadership remains largely intact and is not thought to face an imminent collapse, despite the killing of Ali Khamenei on the first day of strikes and the deaths of many senior officials and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps commanders.

The war is also spreading beyond the air campaign over Iran itself. Israel has intensified strikes in Lebanon, including near central Beirut, as it seeks to curb Hezbollah’s role in the conflict (more below). At sea, the confrontation is becoming more dangerous: 16 civilian ships have reportedly been attacked since the war began, showing how the fighting is now blocking commercial shipping and energy flows through the Strait of Hormuz.

The human and economic toll is rising. Media, official, and humanitarian agency reports suggest the conflict had killed more than 1,300 people in Iran, more than 600 in Lebanon, 12 in Israel, and at least seven U.S. service members, while oil prices climbed back above $100 a barrel. The U.S. has also arranged nearly 50 charter flights to help evacuate Americans from the region since the fighting began.

So where does the war stand now? Militarily, the U.S. and Israel have made real progress in degrading Iranian capabilities and broadening the range of targets they can hit. Politically, however, they remain far from a decisive end-state. Iran is still able to strike back, its governing structure appears battered but unbroken, and the conflict is increasingly spilling into Lebanon, Iraq, the Gulf, and global shipping lanes. In other words, the campaign looks effective as an effort to punish and suppress, but not as a strategy that has brought the war close to an end.

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Mojtaba Khamenei’s 1st message takes a harder line, his condition remains unclear

In the first statement issued in his name since becoming Iran’s new Supreme Leader, Mojtaba Khamenei thanked Iran’s armed forces, called for the Strait of Hormuz to remain closed, and said attacks on U.S. bases in the region would continue. The message, carried by Iranian state media on yesterday, offered the clearest sign so far that Tehran intends to keep widening the war, using both regional military pressure and the threat to global energy flows as leverage.

But the statement also raised further questions about Khamenei himself. No public video or audio of him accompanied the message, and he has not been seen in person since taking power. Multiple reports say the declaration was read on state television rather than delivered by Khamenei directly, adding to uncertainty over his whereabouts and physical condition. For now, his health status remains unclear.

The tone of the statement was uncompromising. Khamenei reportedly argued that the Strait of Hormuz should remain shut and warned neighboring states to close U.S. bases or face continued attack. He also sought to present Iran’s campaign as limited, saying, “We are not an enemy of the countries around us, and we are only targeting the bases of those Americans.” That claim is not convincing. In recent days Iran has continued launching attacks against Gulf Arab states, including Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE, and Iraq (especially Kurdish groups in the north).

Taken together, the message points to two conclusions. First, Iran’s new leadership, or those speaking in its name, wants to project continuity and defiance after the killing of Ali Khamenei. Second, Tehran appears determined to keep the conflict regional, not merely bilateral, by threatening the military, economic, and energy infrastructure that supports the U.S. presence in the Gulf. Whether Mojtaba Khamenei is personally directing that course is harder to judge, because he has not appeared publicly and the regime has produced no clear evidence about his condition.

Strait of Hormuz remains under severe strain

The Strait of Hormuz remains badly disrupted, even if it has not been formally and consistently declared closed. The most important development is the gap between Iran’s public messages. Iran’s new Supreme Leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, said the strait should remain shut as leverage against the U.S. and Israel. Later, Iran’s ambassador to the United Nations said Tehran did not intend to close it and still respected freedom of navigation. For shipowners and traders, that inconsistency has kept uncertainty exceptionally high. It also indicates a wide divide between the traditional political class in Iran and the military leadership centered around the new Supreme Leader.

A second important development is Iran’s statement that ships must coordinate with the Iranian navy when passing through the strait. That is far from a normal commercial transit regime and suggests Tehran is still trying to retain operational control over passage, even while denying that it has imposed an outright closure.

The wider maritime picture has not improved. The JMIC/UKMTO advisory still rates the regional maritime threat as critical, says three commercial vessels were struck in the Strait of Hormuz transit corridor on 10-11 March, and judges that traffic through the strait is likely to remain heavily suppressed in the near term. It also warns of continued missile and drone threats, possible further incidents, and persistent GPS and AIS interference.

The commercial effects are now spreading beyond energy. More than 100 container ships are reportedly backed up in the Strait of Hormuz area, with some cargo moving to air freight as maritime disruption continues. The disruption is also severe enough that Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Kuwait have cut output at some oilfields because storage is filling as exports fail to move normally.

The conclusion is straightforward: over the past 24 hours, the Strait of Hormuz has not returned to normal. The operating environment remains defined by restricted traffic, acute security threats, at least one fresh vessel incident, and conflicting Iranian statements that are keeping markets and shippers on edge.

The Gulf digs in while trying to stay out

The GCC states are still trying to avoid direct involvement in the war with Iran, but they are increasingly operating on a wartime footing across energy, finance, aviation, and internal security. The clearest recent developments have been commercial and defensive rather than openly military: more office closures and staff relocations in Dubai and elsewhere, continued efforts to protect oil exports by routing around Hormuz where possible, and fresh evidence that Gulf governments are placing continuity and damage control ahead of public escalation.

In the UAE, Dubai remains one of the clearest gauges of strain in the Gulf system. Standard Chartered evacuated staff in Dubai, Citigroup temporarily closed most of its UAE branches, and Bloomberg told Gulf-based staff that they could temporarily relocate outside the region. Those moves followed Iranian threats against U.S.- and Israel-linked banking and economic interests in the Gulf, pushing firms toward remote work and contingency planning instead of normal operations.

In Qatar, the main visible development over the past day has been business disruption rather than a new diplomatic initiative. HSBC closed its branches in Qatar, and wider LNG shutdowns were also reported, though TotalEnergies said the effect on its own portfolio was limited. Qatar is still functioning, but under tighter operating conditions.

Saudi Arabia appears focused on resilience. Saudi Aramco is offering 2m barrels of Arab Light for loading from Yanbu on the Red Sea. That matters because it suggests continued reliance on export routes that reduce dependence on the Strait of Hormuz. More broadly, the International Energy Agency said efforts by Saudi Arabia and the UAE to bypass Hormuz may help steady supply as the waterway’s closure produces the largest oil-supply disruption on record.

Across the GCC as a bloc, the political line has not changed much: condemn Iranian attacks, avoid publicly blaming Washington, preserve internal cohesion, and leave room for diplomacy. Statements from the GCC and from GCC-EU channels have condemned Iran’s attacks and reaffirmed the right of GCC states to defend themselves. They have also stressed that GCC territory is not meant to serve as a launchpad against Iran, suggesting that the Gulf monarchies are still trying to balance deterrence with de-escalation.

The wider Gulf environment remains dangerous. Iranian drone activity has intensified in the Gulf, with Dubai and Saudi Arabia intercepting aerial threats. Reporting in recent days also points to repeated Iranian attacks on Gulf cities, ports, oil facilities, and shipping. Even without a dramatic new strike dominating headlines today, the past 24 hours suggest a region under sustained pressure rather than one returning to normal.

The practical conclusion is clear: the GCC states are not, at least publicly, joining the U.S.-Israeli war effort as co-belligerents, but they are moving further into a defensive support role. That means hardening critical infrastructure, keeping oil and gas flowing where possible, protecting financial centers, and quietly preparing for further Iranian strikes while still backing diplomacy, especially through channels such as Oman. The biggest immediate risks for the Gulf over the next day or two are further attacks on economic targets, more shipping disruption, and tighter contingency measures in Dubai, Qatar, and the main energy-export corridors.  

Israel weighs wider Lebanon ground push as focus shifts beyond the Litani

Israel is considering a major new ground operation in Lebanon that could begin within about a week, according to Israeli sources, in what would amount to a significant expansion of the war on the northern front. Kan News said the plan was due to be discussed by Israel’s security cabinet on Friday night (today). Its aim would be to deepen Israeli control in southern Lebanon and establish additional military positions there.

The military logic is becoming clearer. Much of Hezbollah’s recent rocket fire, including roughly 200 rockets launched on Thursday, appears to be coming not from the strip immediately along the border but from ridgelines south and east of Nabatiyeh. From those areas, Hezbollah is believed to be firing 122mm Arash-4 rockets, with an effective range of about 45 kilometers (28 miles), and 220mm Fadi-1 rockets, which can reach roughly 70 kilometers (43.5 miles). That puts a broad stretch of northern Israel within range, including border communities, parts of the Lower and Upper Galilee, and, in some cases, areas as far south as Haifa.

The geography matters. The main launch zones lie between the Litani and Zahrani Rivers, a belt of elevated terrain that gives Hezbollah both cover and reach. For Israel, that complicates the long-standing notion that pushing Hezbollah south of the Litani River would be enough to create a durable buffer zone. Such a move might reduce the threat to parts of the western border, where a belt south of the Litani could create a buffer of roughly 25 kilometers (15.5 miles). But it would do less to protect the eastern sector, where the Galilee Panhandle and the Golan Heights create a more exposed frontier.

A Litani-based line would also fail to solve the rocket problem completely. Positions on ridges north of the river can still support fire into northern Israel, especially when Hezbollah is using longer-range systems. That means an operation built around the Litani alone may no longer satisfy Israeli planners, who appear to be considering whether a deeper belt of control is required.

That is where the Zahrani River enters the picture. According to the apparent logic of the Israeli debate, the next phase would not simply involve holding a zone south of the Litani, but pushing pressure farther north, potentially toward the Zahrani river basin, in order to strike launch areas more heavily and disrupt Hezbollah’s firing network. In practical terms, that could involve wider evacuation orders for Lebanese civilians, heavier air and artillery strikes, and a deeper or more prolonged Israeli ground presence.

If that course is adopted, the operation may not end there. Some Israeli thinking appears to envisage the possible expansion of evacuation orders even farther north, potentially toward the Saineq and Awali River lines, if Hezbollah continues to fire from deeper positions. That would mark a major escalation, not only militarily but politically, because it would widen the area of southern Lebanon being treated as an active combat zone.

For now, the essential point is that Israeli planning appears to be moving away from the idea of a narrow buffer zone and toward something broader: a campaign aimed at suppressing Hezbollah fire from the ridges and river belts that make southern Lebanon strategically important. Whether that turns into a short ground thrust or a larger and more durable occupation zone will depend on the security cabinet’s decision, Hezbollah’s response, and the extent to which Israel believes current strikes have failed to reduce the threat to northern Israel.

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