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What you need to know

Iran raises the stakes on two ground fronts at once

Tehran is widening its campaign beyond missile and drone duels with Washington, pairing explicit threats against Kuwait with an active shadow war against Kurdish targets in northern Iraq. Neither track shows evidence of an imminent full invasion, but both mark a deliberate escalation in rhetoric and operational tempo. The dual-track approach suggests Iran is testing pressure points rather than committing to one theater.

Kuwait threats aim to deter, not necessarily invade

Iranian officials are floating scenarios once considered rhetorical extremes: seizing a U.S. base, taking American troops prisoner. The goal appears to be raising the cost of hosting U.S. forces rather than preparing an actual ground campaign, given the terrain and escalation risks involved.

Infrastructure strikes are already underway

Beyond rhetoric, Iran has hit real targets. Attacks on Kuwaiti power and desalination facilities show Tehran is willing to impose costs on civilian infrastructure, not just military sites, to pressure Kuwait into restricting American operations.

Kurdistan front looks more operationally advanced than Kuwait

Iranian preparations along the Iraqi Kurdistan frontier appear further along than anything aimed at Kuwait. IRGC units, special forces, artillery, armored vehicles, missiles and drones have moved into western Iran, a deployment aimed primarily at blocking Iranian Kurdish factions from opening a second front against Tehran.

Tehran is now hitting even its Kurdish allies

The Tasluja depot belonged to the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), one of Iraqi Kurdistan's two governing parties and historically the faction closer to Tehran. No group has claimed the attack, but Iran is the leading suspect given the timing and pattern of strikes on Kurdish targets. Hitting PUK infrastructure suggests Iran views its security interests as overriding even friendly relationships, a warning to Erbil and Sulaymaniyah alike that neutrality has limits.

Immediate risk

A sustained Iranian invasion of Kuwait remains unlikely given the logistical and escalation barriers. Limited raids, sabotage, or militia action against Kuwait cannot be ruled out. The more immediate risk sits in Iraqi Kurdistan, where cross-border strikes and IRGC deployments point to continued operations against Iranian Kurdish opposition groups and pressure on the PUK to restrict them.

Birthplace of civilization

Kurdistan oil producers go dark as US-Iran conflict spreads

Gulf Keystone halted production today at the Shaikan oilfield, which produces more than 45,000 barrels per day (bpd), citing the escalating conflict between the US and Iran. The shutdown adds to a fast-growing list of Kurdistan producers pulling offline as regional risk climbs.

Why it matters: A collective producer pause in Kurdistan would cut regional output below 100,000 bpd, squeezing export volumes right as the conflict raises broader risk to Gulf energy flows.

Producers halt one by one

HKN Energy had already suspended operations at the Atrush and Sarsang oilfields, which produce roughly 37,000 bpd and 7,000 bpd, respectively. Gulf Keystone's Shaikan shutdown follows the same pattern, removing another major volume from the region's output.

Reports point to a coordinated pullback

Media reports suggest international oil companies across the Kurdistan Region have collectively decided to pause production rather than acting independently. If confirmed, DNO's Tawke and Peshkabir fields have also stopped, and Hunt Oil's Ain Sifni field has likely followed.

Export capacity shrinks sharply

If these reports hold, total Kurdistan Region production has fallen below 100,000 bpd. With around 50,000 bpd needed for local consumption, only an estimated 30,000-50,000 bpd remains available for export alongside crude from Kirkuk.

What to watch

Whether the shutdowns prove temporary or extend as the US-Iran conflict develops, and whether SOMO's pipeline throughput holds steady or drops further. Any additional producer halt, particularly at Kirkuk-linked fields, would tighten export volumes further and add pressure to regional oil markets.

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Houthis threaten a chokepoint Riyadh needs

Yemen's truce faces its biggest test since 2022 after the Houthis declared a maritime embargo on Saudi-linked shipping through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. Brigadier General Yahya Saree announced the measure on July 20, framing it as retaliation for an alleged Saudi blockade of Yemen and the July 13 strike on Sanaa International Airport. No enforcement mechanism has been specified, and the group has not clarified which vessels count as Saudi-linked.

No confirmed attacks yet, but Riyadh isn't dismissing the threat

There's no independently verified evidence the Houthis have hit a Saudi vessel, physically closed the strait, or blocked a ship's passage since the announcement. The embargo remains a threat rather than an operational reality for now. The Saudi-led coalition has still called it an act of maritime piracy and says it's taking steps to protect shipping, though it has not signaled a return to large-scale airstrikes.

Houthi mobilization suggests a long fight, not a bluff

Houthi-organized demonstrations have spread across Ibb, Saada, Hajjah, Taiz and parts of Marib. That kind of public mobilization points to leadership preparing supporters for sustained confrontation rather than a short-term pressure tactic.

The airport standoff that lit the fuse

The crisis traces back to a dispute over an Iranian aircraft carrying a Houthi delegation home from Tehran. Yemen's internationally recognized government said the flight was unauthorized and struck the Sanaa runway to block its landing; the plane diverted to Hodeidah instead. The Houthis blamed Saudi Arabia and retaliated with missiles and drones, including a strike on Abha International Airport, which Saudi defenses intercepted with no confirmed casualties. Houthi leader Abdul Malik al-Houthi then threatened Saudi airports, ports, and oil infrastructure directly. However, tensions had been rising for some weeks due to a strange tribal dispute involving a woman claiming to be the daughter of Saddam Hussein, which led to the beginning of pro-Houthi tribal mobilizations against the tribes who were supporting this woman and were seen as pro-Saudi.

Hormuz disruption raises the stakes at Bab el-Mandeb

The wider U.S.-Iran conflict has made this chokepoint matter more. Disruption in the Strait of Hormuz has pushed Saudi Arabia to lean harder on its East-West Pipeline and the Red Sea port of Yanbu, but oil shipped from Yanbu to Asia still has to pass through Bab el-Mandeb. That gives the Houthis real leverage over Riyadh's main alternative export route, not just a symbolic threat.

What to expect

Selective enforcement is more likely than a full closure: warnings, published target lists, or a small number of strikes on Saudi-linked vessels. Even one successful hit could push shipowners to suspend passages voluntarily. Riyadh will likely boost naval protection and prepare strikes on Houthi missile launchers, drone sites and coastal surveillance, while trying to avoid restarting the open-ended 2015-22 air campaign.

It’s the U.S. vs China, everyone needs to pick a side

China's Taiwan pressure moves from the air to the sea

Beijing's coercion campaign is taking on an increasingly maritime shape. In the 24 hours ending 6 a.m. on July 21, Taiwan detected four PLA aircraft, five PLA Navy ships and six Chinese "official ships" around the island. The aircraft count was modest, but the presence of 11 naval and government vessels points to a deliberate shift toward encirclement rather than aerial intimidation alone.

Air incursions are now a volume dial, not a constant

PLA air activity is fluctuating by design. Taiwan logged 30 Chinese military aircraft on July 3 and 28 on July 9, far above the smaller formations seen mid-month. That variability lets Beijing show it can spike pressure on demand without absorbing the cost of daily large-scale exercises.

Coast guard and research vessels are quietly testing enforcement power

The real shift is at sea. Taiwan recorded 55 sightings of Chinese Coast Guard, research and other government vessels around the island in June.

The east coast is no longer a safe rear approach

Taiwan's east coast has long been treated as the safer route for energy supplies, military equipment and outside assistance in a conflict. Rising Chinese activity in the western Pacific threatens that assumption, forcing Taiwan to split limited naval and Coast Guard assets between the Strait and the Pacific coast.

Carrier transits and joint drills widen the rehearsal space

China's newest carrier, the Fujian, passed through the Taiwan Strait on June 23, just after Taiwan began exercises to prepare for a sudden attack. The transit wasn't a prelude to hostilities, but it demonstrated Beijing's readiness to send advanced platforms through sensitive waters on a routine basis. Chinese and Russian naval drills, followed by Chinese live-fire exercises near Japanese-controlled waters, rehearse operations along possible reinforcement routes from Japan, extending the contingency further into the Pacific.

The likely path is graduated blockade, not invasion

There's no visible sign of the mass mobilization that would precede an imminent invasion: no concentration of amphibious forces, no widespread requisition of civilian shipping, no large-scale reserve callup, no sustained closure of ports or airspace. The posture instead resembles preparation for a graduated blockade built on legal claims over Taiwan's surrounding waters, potentially starting with ship inspections, temporary exclusion zones or selective disruption of commercial traffic.

Taiwan is adjusting its own posture in response, emphasizing rapid transition from peacetime to wartime command and folding HIMARS rocket systems and Hsiung Feng anti-ship missiles into drills focused on maritime incursions, alongside combined naval and Coast Guard exercises to protect eastern supply routes. The core risk going forward: the same ships and procedures used for routine coercion could double as cover for the opening phase of a larger operation, making pressure and preparation for war increasingly hard to tell apart.

Instability from Sahel to Horn of Africa amid state fragility, Russian interference, & Islamist insurgencies

Jihadist alliance exposes Mali's supply lines

A new tactical partnership is doing real damage in Mali. Fighters from the al-Qaeda-linked Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and the Tuareg-led Azawad Liberation Front ambushed a major Malian military convoy on July 18 near Tabrichat, on the road between Anéfis and Gao. The combination of jihadist manpower and Tuareg local knowledge of northern terrain is proving more effective than either group operating alone.

The ambush was worse than officials admitted

The convoy included Malian troops, pro-government personnel and reportedly members of Russia's Africa Corps, though Russian participation and casualties remain unconfirmed. JNIM and the Azawad Liberation Front claimed to have killed or captured dozens of soldiers and seized or destroyed armored vehicles, backed by images of prisoners and abandoned equipment. Mali's army confirmed the convoy was attacked and said air and precision strikes on three insurgent positions let survivors reach Gao, but no reliable casualty count has emerged.

Central Mali sees a parallel offensive

JNIM also attacked and briefly overran a Malian army position at Kouakourou, in the central Mopti region, on or around July 18, with initial reports of casualties and equipment losses. Pro-government sources later described Malian air and ground operations around Kouakourou, Didiéni and Saman as the army tried to disrupt JNIM concentrations and retake ground. The two-front pressure, north and center, is forcing Malian forces to stretch thin rather than concentrate on any single threat.

Niger's western border absorbs a heavy toll

Niger's Defense Ministry confirmed on July 19 that an attack near Téra, in the western Tillabéri region, killed 16 soldiers and wounded 23, nine of them seriously. The attack happened July 17 and was confirmed just inside the government's 72-hour reporting window.

The near term

Further ambushes are likely along northern Mali's main transport routes, with JNIM likely to keep hitting rural bases in Mopti and Gao. Western Niger and northern Burkina Faso remain exposed as jihadist groups work to stop the Alliance of Sahel States from massing forces in any one theater. The bigger risk for Bamako: sustained attacks on convoys could leave remote garrisons dependent on costly, vulnerable air resupply as the only remaining lifeline.

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