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What you need to know

Washington has rhetorically escalated the conflict in the Persian Gulf with a direct 48-hour ultimatum threatening Iranian power plants, while also appearing to prepare additional forces for operations around the Strait of Hormuz. 

Washington is also moving ahead with the deployment of two Marine expeditionary units, each with roughly 2,500 personnel, landing ships, F-35s, and other supporting assets. Elements of the 82nd Airborne Division also appear to be preparing for possible deployment to the Iran theater. Speculation is growing that the United States may seek to seize the northern shore of the Strait of Hormuz rather than Khargh Island, though Khargh remains a possible secondary target.

Tehran, in turn, is signaling a strategy of horizontal escalation, threatening Gulf desalination and energy infrastructure, maritime chokepoints beyond Hormuz, and potentially even financial and cyber-linked targets.  

Across the Gulf, Iran’s threats against desalination plants underline a central regional vulnerability. In the UAE, desalinated water accounts for more than 80% of drinking water, and the country reportedly holds around 90 days of clean-water reserves. Bahrain has been fully dependent on desalinated water since 2016, with groundwater kept for contingencies. Qatar is fully dependent on desalination, while in Saudi Arabia about half of water supply comes from it.  

The most important practical effect is the emergence of interlocking infrastructure vulnerabilities. Gulf states remain highly exposed because of their reliance on desalination and concentrated energy assets.

At the same time, disruption at Ras Laffan has begun producing second-order global shocks in LNG and helium, with implications not only for energy markets but also for semiconductor production, especially AI-related supply chains in East Asia. The conflict is therefore no longer defined chiefly by battlefield exchanges, but by each side’s ability to impose cascading economic, technological, and civilian costs across a much wider region.

The center of gravity is shifting toward regional infrastructure warfare rather than a bounded military on military confrontation. Power plants, desalination facilities, ports, chokepoints, LNG exports, bridges, and logistics hubs are becoming targets or threatened targets. Deterrence and escalation are increasingly being expressed through civilian-critical systems. 

The most consequential near-term risk is not only direct military damage, but compounding disruption across energy, water, shipping, and high-technology supply chains. Constraints around Hormuz, LNG shortages, and the helium shock linked to Qatar are creating the conditions for wider economic fallout across Asia, the Gulf, and Europe even before the war reaches any clear military decision.

Operationally, the United States has moved sharply. President Trump warned that if Tehran does not fully reopen the Strait of Hormuz, the United States will strike Iranian power plants, beginning with the largest. The deadline falls at 7:44 p.m. EST on 23 March. The ultimatum came only a day after Trump suggested that the United States was winding down, adding to uncertainty over Washington’s policy. Iran replied by warning that any U.S. strike on Iranian power plants would trigger attacks on regional energy infrastructure, information-technology systems, and desalination plants. 

Iran, meanwhile, is reportedly selling more oil than at any point in the past 46 years and at record prices, giving its economy badly needed revenue. In addition to threatening GCC infrastructure, Tehran has also threatened shipping in the Bab al-Mandab and Red Sea. Any disruption there would affect roughly a quarter of global energy supplies. Parliament Speaker Mohammad Baqer Ghalibaf warned that financial entities funding the U.S. military budget are legitimate targets, implying potential threats to international financial institutions outside the immediate theater. IRGC-affiliated Mehr News warned that even a limited strike on Iran’s electricity infrastructure would cause the wider region to “go dark.” 

Iran also reportedly attempted to strike the U.S.-British base at Diego Garcia with two Khorramshahr missiles; one was intercepted and the other failed in flight. If accurate, that would suggest Iran has missiles with a range of up to 4,000 km, beyond its previously stated self-imposed cap of 2,000 km. 

Meanwhile, the United States and Israel struck the Natanz nuclear site on Saturday, including facilities linked to advanced centrifuges. The IAEA says there is no evidence of a nuclear leak there. 

Iranian retaliation has also reached Israel more directly. Missiles struck Dimona and Arad late on 21 March, damaging residential areas and injuring roughly 180 to 200 people across the two cities. Because Dimona houses Israel’s nuclear facility, the strike appears to have been retaliation for the earlier U.S.-Israeli strike on Natanz. A cluster bomb also landed in Tel Aviv’s Carmel Market yesterday, destroying an apartment building and damaging several vehicles. Israel’s ambassador to Washington, Yechiel Leiter, told CNN that “boots on the ground” may be necessary to win the war against Iran.

More broadly, U.S. and Israeli forces have so far struck around 1,700 targets in Iran tied to missile and drone programs, including missiles, launchers, fuel stocks, component stockpiles, and production facilities. Iran’s ability to project force remains considerable, but it is much reduced from its pre-28 February level.

Lebanon

Lebanon is deepening its involvement in Lebanon. Another major bridge over the Litani River was destroyed by the Israeli Air Force yesterday. Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz said operations in Lebanon are about to intensify and that all bridges over the Litani are to be destroyed to prevent Hezbollah from moving arms south. He also said Israel would accelerate the demolition of Lebanese homes in the border area.

South Lebanon is now effectively cut off from the rest of the country. The affected zone accounts for about 15% of Lebanon’s landmass and roughly one million displaced people.

A Lebanese government plan to resettle displaced Shia from south Lebanon and south Beirut in Karantina, near Beirut port, is drawing strong opposition from Christian political groups, which argue that such a move would transplant Dahiyeh’s demographic and security problems into central Christian areas of Beirut and increase the risk of Israeli strikes.

Israeli forces appear to have made further gains along the Lebanon front, with new troop deployments and advances reported both in the Kfarchouba-Chebaa area and around al-Khiam. The 810th Mountain Brigade, part of the 210th Territorial Division, is said to have advanced roughly 2.5 kilometers (1.6 miles) beyond the Lebanese border, driving a wedge between Kfarchouba and Chebaa and taking Jabal Sedana, a commanding height overlooking both towns and the roads leading into them.

In the strategic town of Khiam, Israeli forces are reportedly continuing operations against remaining Radwan Force elements, with fighting concentrated on three main axes. One push has targeted the dense center of the town near the Amel Medical Center, where narrow alleyways, sloped roads, concealed garages, and multi-story buildings have slowed the advance. Israeli troops are said to have entered only around half of the central district so far, though they are expected to move deeper as the number of Hezbollah fighters operating there appears to be falling.

Israel has also put greater weight on an eastern flanking maneuver. Positions around the town’s water tower and adjacent minaret now appear to be under Israeli control. Forces also reportedly used a road east of Khiam to bypass the center and reach the northern Jalahiyah neighborhood, where they have apparently been present since at least 20 March.

Over the weekend, 110 Hezbollah attack waves against Israel were identified, a clear escalation. Most involved rockets and missiles, with drones making up a smaller but still notable share, alongside a handful of anti-tank missile strikes and other incidents involving improvised explosive devices and small arms. Hezbollah said 43 of the attacks targeted IDF forces operating in south Lebanon, though fire also spilled into Israeli border communities. The attacks were concentrated in the border area and Galilee, but also reached urban centers in northern Israel, including Kiryat Shmona and Ma’alot. The pattern suggests Hezbollah is trying both to pressure Israeli forces and to create civilian insecurity in northern Israel. Two IDF soldiers were reportedly injured by mortar shrapnel. Since Hezbollah entered the fighting on 2 March, 779 attack waves have been recorded. Those figures refer to attack waves rather than total munitions fired, and they measure attempted attacks rather than final impact.

Iraq

Iraq, too, is edging deeper into the conflict. Multiple airstrikes, either Israeli or American, targeted Shia militia positions in Mosul yesterday. Eight overnight militia attacks struck the U.S. diplomatic and logistics center at Baghdad International Airport despite the five-day ceasefire negotiated by the Iraqi government late last week. On Saturday, a militia-fired rocket killed an Iraqi intelligence officer when it hit Iraqi National Intelligence Service headquarters in Baghdad’s Mansour district. The strike appears to have deliberately and precisely targeted the INIS signals-intelligence facility.

Supply chain disruption

The maritime and energy picture is deteriorating in parallel. Of the LNG cargoes that left the Gulf before hostilities began on 28 February, only one more is due to arrive in Asia, while six more are due in Europe.

South Asia is expected to be hit especially hard by the LNG shortage. Pakistan, for instance, relies on Qatar for 99% of its LNG imports. Thailand has already reactivated two coal-fired units because of LNG shortages. Australia is preparing a fuel-rationing scheme: about 90% of its fuel comes from Asia, which itself depends heavily on Middle Eastern supply. As of yesterday, 42 Australian fuel stations had no fuel at all, while 107 had run out of diesel, with those figures expected to rise today.

Qatar’s helium disruption is also emerging as a major second-order shock. Iranian attacks on Ras Laffan have halted output from a facility supplying roughly 30% of global helium. Spot helium prices have surged, and shortages could appear within weeks as containers remain stranded in the Gulf. Helium is essential for semiconductor manufacturing, especially advanced AI chips, as well as for other high-technology and medical uses. South Korea appears especially exposed because of its heavy dependence on Qatari helium. Samsung and SK Hynix have reportedly activated conservation protocols, prioritizing high-margin AI memory while slowing legacy production lines. Reduced wafer starts now could translate into a significant semiconductor supply gap by the third quarter of 2026. Logistics are worsening the problem: the Strait of Hormuz is closed to Western shipping, overland alternatives are limited, and liquid helium gradually evaporates even in specialized containers. Markets are beginning to price in these risks, with Korean chip stocks falling sharply and pressure building on TSMC as well.

Civil aviation reflects the same strain. Twenty Qatar Airways aircraft are now stored at Teruel in Spain after five additional aircraft flew there yesterday, pointing to a sharp reduction in regional air traffic and growing concern over risks to civilian aircraft.

Essentially, the conflict has moved beyond the logic of a contained exchange among Iran, Israel, and the United States and into the logic of systemic regional conflict.

The widening range of exposed systems, from shipping lanes, LNG exports, desalination, and power generation to bridges, logistics hubs, and helium supplies tied to semiconductor production, is what gives this phase of the war its strategic significance. It is no longer only a question of military attrition. It is a question of how much economic, technological, and civilian stress the region, and the wider world, can absorb before deterrence gives way to uncontrolled escalation.

The most plausible near-term outcome remains a prolonged war of attrition under conditions of selective maritime coercion and expanding infrastructure pressure. But the gap between that scenario and something much more dangerous has narrowed sharply.

A conflict in which desalination plants, power grids, and both Middle Eastern chokepoints, Hormuz and the Bab al-Mandab, are fully drawn into the war would be something else entirely: not merely a regional energy crisis, but a deep rupture across global trade, industry, and state resilience. Even without total collapse, the baseline has shifted decisively upward. Prolonged disruption is becoming the new normal.

Rumors of Gulf reserve sales add to gold rout

Gold came under heavy pressure as Asian markets opened on 23 March, with bullion sliding through the $4,500-an-ounce threshold and briefly touching $4,097.99 before recovering some ground to trade near $4,203. The fall deepened what was already gold’s worst weekly decline since 1983, a sign of the strain spreading across commodities and wider financial markets.

The sell-off was accompanied by unconfirmed chatter that Gulf monetary authorities were liquidating part of their gold reserves to raise cash as regional pressures mounted. But there is no credible public evidence that the central banks of Saudi Arabia, Qatar, or the United Arab Emirates have begun selling gold.

The more plausible explanation for the slump lies in broader macroeconomic and liquidity pressures. Oil prices above $110 a barrel, a stronger dollar, and rising expectations that central banks may keep policy tighter for longer have all weighed on gold, even as war risks have increased. There has also been forced selling, with investors offloading liquid assets such as gold to meet margin calls and cover losses elsewhere.

Even so, the reserve-sale story may have gained traction because Qatar is widely seen as having the means to monetize part of its gold holdings if conditions worsen. The country’s central bank holds roughly $18 billion in gold, and those reserves could, in theory, be sold alongside sovereign-wealth assets in a deeper crisis. For now, though, that remains a possibility, not proof that such sales are taking place.

Birthplace of civilization

Washington targets Hezbollah’s global finance network

The United States on 20 March unveiled a new round of sanctions against a sprawling financial network that Washington says has helped Hezbollah launder money and raise funds across several jurisdictions. In effect, the move is aimed not only at individual operatives, but also at the commercial machinery behind them: family-controlled firms, proxy owners, and cross-border business vehicles that U.S. officials say have helped divert more than $100 million to Hezbollah since 2020.

At the center of the action is Alaa Hassan Hamieh, whom the U.S. Treasury Department describes as a Hezbollah financier and former public investment official. Treasury says Hamieh oversaw a network of 16 individuals and entities spanning Lebanon, Syria, Poland, Slovenia, Qatar, and Canada. According to the department, the network used relatives, associates, and front companies to conceal beneficial ownership while moving money through procurement, money laundering, and project-finance activity tied to Hezbollah’s finance apparatus.

Treasury identified several firms involved in the scheme, including Seven Seas SAL Offshore, Seven Seas Group S.A.R.L., Calllync S.A.L. Offshore, the Polish firm Calllync Sp. z o.o., the Slovenian firm Calllync d.o.o., and Seven Seas for International Trading and Logistics in Canada. U.S. officials say some members of the network were involved in telecommunications and other business ventures, while others acted as proxies, tracked funds, or helped establish front structures, including one in Iraq. Treasury also linked parts of the network to previously sanctioned Hezbollah finance figures, including Muhammad Al-Bazzal, Rashid Al-Bazzal, and Ali Qasir.

The sanctions were imposed under Executive Order 13224, the main U.S. counterterrorism sanctions authority. That means any property or interests in property belonging to the designated persons that fall within U.S. jurisdiction are blocked. U.S. persons are generally barred from dealing with them, and foreign firms or financial institutions that continue doing business with the network could expose themselves to sanctions. The broader aim is to make it harder for Hezbollah to shelter behind ostensibly legitimate commercial activity in multiple countries while continuing to fund militant operations.

It’s now the U.S. vs China, everyone needs to pick a side

Ukraine takes the drone war deeper into Russia

The war between Russia and Ukraine is being shaped not only by grinding attrition at the front, but also by an expanding contest of long-range strikes deep behind the lines.

On 23 March Ukrainian drones hit Primorsk on the Baltic, setting a fuel reservoir ablaze at one of Russia’s largest western oil-export hubs, a terminal capable of shipping more than 1 million barrels of crude a day. The strike followed earlier attacks on fuel infrastructure in southern Russia, including the depot at Labinsk in Krasnodar region, which OSW says was hit on 16 March. Russian independent reporting said 18 tanks caught fire there, pointing to a serious disruption in fuel storage that supports operations in southern Ukraine.

The attacks indicate that Ukraine has greatly expanded both the scale and the reach of its deep-strike campaign this month. Russian officials said that 250 Ukrainian drones were shot down near Moscow during a weekend attack, the biggest attempted strike on the capital in at least a year, while Sergei Shoigu, secretary of Russia’s Security Council, warned that no Russian region could now be considered safe.

Independent and Ukrainian-aligned tracking also points to a clear acceleration in Ukraine’s long-range drone operations through March, even as Russian drone pressure on Ukraine remains heavy. In one seven-day period ending on 17 March, Russia launched 740 strike drones at Ukraine, implying an average of roughly 106 a day.

The broader picture is not that Russia’s aerial campaign has ended, but that Ukraine is contesting Russia far more seriously in the deep battle, turning oil ports, fuel depots, industrial plants and air-defense zones inside Russia into regular targets.

Move fast and break things

Shutdown talks stall as DHS split widens

Talks to end the partial shutdown of the Department of Homeland Security remained deadlocked on 23 March, as senators in both parties suggested that negotiations over immigration-enforcement funding were moving sideways rather than toward a settlement.

Republicans still say they want a full DHS spending bill, but some are increasingly discussing a fallback option that would fund the rest of the department while leaving Immigration and Customs Enforcement and Customs and Border Protection unresolved.

Senator Susan Collins said there had been no meaningful progress and accused Democrats of canceling a planned meeting instead of presenting a new offer.

Senator John Kennedy said he no longer believed Democrats would vote to fund ICE or CBP in any meaningful way.

The divide in Republican messaging suggests that the talks have drifted beyond ordinary bargaining and into contingency planning.

The substance of the dispute has not changed. Democrats want tighter operational limits and stronger accountability measures for immigration enforcement, including stricter identification rules, broader use of body cameras, and tougher standards for entering private property. Republicans and the White House have resisted changes they believe would materially restrict ICE and CBP.

President Donald Trump has further complicated the search for a deal by urging Republicans not to strike a DHS funding agreement unless Democrats also support the SAVE Act, adding a separate dispute over voting law to an already stalled negotiation. In practical terms, the parties do not appear to be entering the final stage of talks. Instead, they remain in a phase of public blame and political pressure, with a narrow compromise on full departmental funding looking improbable and a partial workaround for the Transportation Security Administration, or for the rest of DHS, appearing the more plausible fallback if the impasse persists.

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