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What you need to know

Hormuz conflict returns to high intensity, multi-front operations

The U.S.-Iran confrontation has moved past a limited exchange into a sustained campaign spanning the Strait of Hormuz and five Gulf states. Washington is hitting Iranian military infrastructure directly while Tehran retaliates against American-linked facilities across the region. This is no longer contained, it's regional.

President Donald Trump has declared the prior ceasefire framework effectively dead, though Washington hasn't fully closed the door on talks. Neither side is backing down: the U.S. wants the strait open by force, Iran wants passage rights and an end to U.S. operations.

U.S. strikes widen to over 300 targets

CENTCOM has run successive attack waves since July 7, hitting Iranian air defenses, coastal radars, missile and drone sites, command networks, naval vessels and logistics infrastructure. The second major wave on July 8 alone struck roughly 90 targets. Subsequent nights pushed the total past 300, one of the most intensive sustained U.S. campaigns in the region in years.

Washington is now using fighter aircraft, warships, conventional missiles, one-way attack drones and, per CENTCOM, one-way attack maritime drones. The addition of unmanned surface systems marks an expansion in how the U.S. is degrading Iran's naval and coastal capability.

Iran spreads retaliation across five countries

Tehran is no longer confining its response to U.S. forces near Iran. It has claimed strikes on U.S.-linked installations in Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman and Jordan, though most damage claims remain unverified.

Bahrain, home to the U.S. Navy's Fifth Fleet headquarters, has repeatedly activated air-raid sirens and intercepted aerial threats. Qatar reported civilian injuries, including a child, from falling debris. Oman confirmed drone strikes in Musandam, which overlooks the strait's southern flank. Jordan intercepted missiles with no reported damage. The UAE activated defenses but confirmed no successful strikes on its territory, and Saudi Arabia reported no confirmed attacks.

This is a deliberate Iranian strategy: raise the cost of U.S. strikes by threatening the bases and logistics networks that support them, and put Gulf host states in an impossible middle position.

Hormuz shipping collapses, LNG flow in question

Commercial transits through Hormuz have dropped sharply, with tracking data showing only a small number of confirmed passages at the height of fighting. Many vessels are switching off their Automatic Identification System transponders, making real traffic levels hard to verify, and complicating the U.S. Navy's own higher transit counts.

The most serious single incident: the Cyprus-flagged container ship GFS Galaxy was struck near Oman, suffering fire and major engine-room damage. Omani authorities rescued most of the crew; one sailor remains missing. Iran said the ship used an unauthorized route; Washington cited the attack as justification for further strikes.

The absence of visible LNG tanker traffic is the number to watch. Qatar depends heavily on Hormuz for gas exports, and any sustained drop threatens global supply.

The pattern

The most likely near-term pattern: continued U.S. strikes on Iranian missile, radar and naval targets, met by Iranian retaliation against U.S.-linked Gulf facilities. Neither side shows signs of de-escalating.

It’s the U.S. vs China, everyone needs to pick a side

EU and UK unite to expose Russia's cyber proxies

Brussels and London rolled out their first joint cyber sanctions package on July 13, hitting Russian intelligence officers, criminal hackers and the companies that connect them. The UK designated 24 individuals and entities; the EU hit nine individuals and four organizations. The lists differ but share one goal: mapping the links between Russian spy agencies and the criminal networks doing their dirty work.

The framing matters more than the names. Both governments now describe Russia's cyber activity as an integrated system rather than scattered incidents, one that lets Moscow outsource espionage and sabotage to hacktivists and private firms while keeping deniability intact.

FSB unit tied to Poland power grid plot

The EU singled out the FSB's 16th Centre, accusing it of directing multiple cyber-threat groups including Turla, and of running escalating operations since 2010. Both London and Brussels formally attributed an attempted attack on Poland's electricity grid to this unit, marking a rare joint attribution of critical infrastructure sabotage.

The UK said the plot could have cut power to 500,000 people in winter had it succeeded. That's a shift from espionage to attempted physical disruption, and it's the detail driving the entire package.

GRU widens its bench with civilian hackers

British sanctions named three GRU officers, Vyacheslav Stafeyev, Ivan Senin and Ivan Kasyanenko, for directing cyber and hybrid operations. London also designated IMPULS, a company accused of feeding recruits from Russian universities into GRU Unit 29155's cyber wing.

This is the operational story: Unit 29155, long linked to sabotage abroad, is folding in criminal hackers and civilian technical talent. That lets Moscow scale capability without expanding its uniformed intelligence footprint, and it complicates attribution for Western agencies going forward.

Malware and disinformation get folded in

The UK also sanctioned individuals tied to Lumma Stealer, malware built to harvest passwords and browser data. The National Crime Agency counted at least 2,100 British victims in the past six months alone, and London says stolen credentials fed directly into espionage operations.

Ten more people were designated over Rybar LLC, a media operation accused of spreading disinformation on Ukraine and interfering in politics in Moldova and Armenia. Bundling malware crime with information warfare in one sanctions package shows both governments now treat hacking, disinformation and electoral interference as one continuous threat rather than separate files.

France escalates diplomatically

Paris is summoning the Russian ambassador over the campaign. French Foreign Minister Jean-Noël Barrot said the operations aimed either to steal sensitive data or sabotage infrastructure, specifically naming railways and energy facilities as targets.

Implications

The sanctions raise legal, financial and reputational costs but won't dismantle networks whose operators stay inside Russia, beyond EU-UK reach.

The real test is whether this joint attribution model expands, more coordinated packages, more infrastructure-focused targeting, and whether it deters proxy recruitment or simply pushes Unit 29155 and the FSB's 16th Centre to diversify further into looser, harder-to-trace networks.

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China targets Japan as coalition widens South China Sea pushback

A 15-country coalition, including the United States, Japan, the Philippines, Australia and Britain, issued a joint declaration on July 12 reaffirming that China's expansive South China Sea claims have no basis in international law. The European Union issued a parallel statement. Beijing's response, an unusually direct rebuke of Tokyo, is the real story here, not the anniversary statement itself.

The declaration goes further than a routine endorsement of the 2016 arbitration ruling that rejected China's claims. It explicitly condemns the use of coast guards, maritime militias and military forces to intimidate other states and alter the regional status quo, language aimed squarely at Beijing's gray-zone tactics.

China calls ruling "waste paper," summons Japan's envoy

Beijing dismissed the tribunal ruling as illegal and "waste paper." It summoned Japan's senior diplomat in Beijing and warned it would respond "firmly and forcefully" to what it called Japanese provocations, explicitly linking the maritime dispute to Tokyo's more assertive position on Taiwan.

Singling out Japan, rather than just the U.S. and Philippines, is the shift to watch. It suggests Beijing now sees Tokyo as a principal opponent in the region's maritime disputes, not a secondary player.

Japan links three flashpoints into one theater

Tokyo is increasingly drawing a direct line between the South China Sea, Taiwan and the Luzon Strait, the waterway separating Taiwan from the northern Philippines. All three are central to Japan's sea lanes and to the U.S. military's ability to operate across the western Pacific.

The China-Japan exchange points toward a widening contest that could connect flashpoints across the first island chain, from the South China Sea to Taiwan to the Luzon Strait. That's still an analytical read, not a confirmed policy shift, but Beijing's choice to confront Tokyo directly is a departure from treating the U.S. and Philippines as the primary counterparts.

Birthplace of civilization

Baghdad pivots Washington relationship from security to economics

Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi left for Washington on July 13 for a week-long visit, his first official foreign trip since taking office less than two months ago. He's leading a senior government and business delegation and is expected to meet President Donald Trump along with administration officials and U.S. financial and commercial representatives.

Iraqi government spokesman Haider al-Aboudi said the trip marks a deliberate shift away from a relationship dominated by military and security questions toward deeper economic partnership. Everything discussed will stay within the 2008 U.S.-Iraq Strategic Framework Agreement, which already covers economic, diplomatic, cultural and security cooperation.

Energy deals anchor the visit

Several memorandums of understanding are expected in oil and gas. Baghdad wants U.S. companies capable of boosting Iraqi production capacity, developing gas resources and modernizing energy infrastructure. Talks will also cover trade, technology and investment, potentially channeled through a proposed Iraqi-American development and energy fund.

Militia disarmament is the real test

Washington has repeatedly pressed Baghdad to dismantle or disarm Iran-backed factions operating with significant political, military and economic autonomy. Some militia groups have signaled willingness to surrender some weapons; more hardline factions are resisting full disarmament.

This isn't just a security issue, it's an investment precondition. Major U.S. companies won't commit to long-term projects without assurance that Baghdad can enforce contracts and keep armed factions out of commercial activity. Al-Zaidi is framing the arms-control campaign as a sovereign stability measure rather than a concession to Washington.

Dollar flows now a bargaining chip

The Trump administration suspended U.S. banknote shipments to Baghdad after the Iran war began, pressuring Iraq to block dollars from reaching Iran and its militia allies. The two governments have since reached an understanding: Iraq tightens dollar-flow controls, and Washington resumes cash deliveries drawn from Iraqi oil revenue held at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.

This financial mechanism gives Washington real leverage over Baghdad's next moves, and ties the disarmament question directly to Iraq's access to physical dollars.

Baghdad's balancing act gets harder

Al-Zaidi has to convince Washington that Iraq remains a reliable partner while still managing a workable relationship with Iran. Baghdad has long tried to balance both powers, but the ongoing U.S.-Iran confrontation is narrowing that room to maneuver.

For Trump, the visit is a chance to show that pressure on Iran can generate commercial upside for American firms. For al-Zaidi, it's an early test of whether political goodwill converts into real investment and security backing without triggering a domestic fight with powerful armed factions.

Outcomes

Energy agreements will be the most visible outcome of the trip and the easiest to announce. The harder, slower-moving variable is whether Baghdad actually follows through on militia disarmament and dollar-flow controls, since that's what determines whether U.S. companies commit capital long-term.

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Fisherman's killing reopens Iraq-Kuwait maritime fault line

A Kuwaiti Coast Guard patrol opened fire on Iraqi fishing boat IFB166 on July 3, killing fisherman Najm Abdullah Khalid and wounding Thaer Mohammed Salman near the disputed maritime boundary. Three other crew members were detained. The incident stayed quiet until it broke publicly in Iraq between July 6 and 7, triggering anger among fishermen, tribal groups and Basra politicians. What looked like a routine coast guard encounter has now become a live diplomatic crisis.

The location dispute is the core problem, and it's unresolved. Basra politicians and the Al-Faw Fishermen's Association say the boat was in Iraqi waters. Kuwait hasn't published a detailed public account, but showed Iraqi officials video footage, and told Iraq's Foreign Ministry the encounter happened at night with no intent to cause casualties. Public evidence still can't confirm whose waters the boat was in or whether warning procedures were followed.

Baghdad moves fast, Kuwait releases fishermen

The crisis landed in the middle of Iraqi Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein's official visit to Kuwait on July 8, alongside National Security Advisor Qasim al-Aboudi and Basra Governor Asaad al-Eidani. Hussein raised the case directly with First Deputy Prime Minister and Interior Minister Sheikh Fahad Yusuf Saud Al-Sabah. Kuwait agreed to return the four surviving fishermen and Khalid's body, which crossed into Iraq through the Safwan border point.

The quick release cooled the immediate temperature, but Baghdad isn't treating it as resolved.

Baghdad escalates the follow-up

Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi instructed the Foreign Ministry, military leadership and Basra security authorities on July 11 to investigate the killing and pursue legal measures to prevent repeat incidents. The Foreign Ministry is still pushing for results from Kuwait's own investigation and wants clearer naval communication and coordination mechanisms between the two countries going forward.

Basra street pressure builds

Iraqi security forces deployed around the Kuwaiti consulate in Basra on July 11, and demonstrators gathered outside it on July 12 demanding accountability and stronger protection for Iraqi fishermen. Protests remain under heavy security, with no consulate closure or diplomatic rupture reported.

Implications

The killing has reactivated older Iraqi grievances over Khor Abdullah, fishing access rights and the unresolved maritime boundary, issues that predate this incident by years.

The main risk is that domestic pressure in Basra and Iraq's parliament turns a single coast guard shooting into a renewed national fight over maritime sovereignty, forcing Baghdad into a harder line than either government currently wants.

Instability from Sahel to Horn of Africa amid state fragility, Russian interference, & Islamist insurgencies

Mali breaks Anéfis blockade as Sahel alliance shows military teeth

Mali's armed forces broke a rebel blockade around the northern town of Anéfis after days of fighting, the most significant Sahel security development in the past 72 hours. Russian Africa Corps personnel and pro-government local fighters joined Malian troops in reopening the road between Gao and Anéfis, a critical corridor linking government territory with positions near Kidal, the main Tuareg rebel stronghold.

Mali's military said a reinforcement convoy reached the garrison after an earlier column was ambushed, and claimed air and ground operations destroyed 12 rebel vehicles and killed close to 100 fighters. Those figures are unverified. The Tuareg-led Azawad Liberation Front (FLA) confirmed its withdrawal but called it a tactical regrouping, reporting five fighters killed and roughly ten wounded while claiming much heavier losses on the government side.

Convoy warfare exposes Mali's core weakness

Holding Anéfis required a large reinforcement convoy, air support, Russian personnel and local auxiliaries, a lot of firepower to defend one position. That's the real story: government columns remain exposed to ambushes, drones and roadside attacks across Mali's long, open supply routes, even when they ultimately prevail.

The fight also exposed a deepening tactical overlap between separatist and jihadist groups. Both the FLA and the al-Qaeda-linked Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) reportedly took part in attacks around the corridor. Their objectives differ, but the combination, Tuareg local knowledge and desert warfare experience paired with JNIM's manpower, explosives and drones, is raising the pressure on Mali's military beyond what either group could apply alone.

Sahel alliance may be moving from paper to practice

The FLA claims Nigerien and Burkinabe forces also took part in relieving Anéfis, an assertion none of the three governments have confirmed. If verified, it would mark a real shift, the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) moving from political declaration to actual joint military operation.

Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger formed the AES after quitting the Economic Community of West African States and have promised a unified force against jihadist groups. Direct participation in an active battle would be the first sign that promise is becoming operational reality rather than a communique.

Russia deepens its Sahel foothold

The Anéfis operation followed Russia's agreement to expand military cooperation with the AES states, including further training, equipment and operational support through the Africa Corps, which replaced most of the former Wagner Group presence. Russian personnel are proving central to Mali's ability to reinforce distant positions and run combined air-ground operations, not a peripheral contribution.

Mali and Algeria pull back from the brink

Mali restored ambassadors with Algeria and reopened its airspace, ending a rupture that began in April 2025 when Algeria shot down a Malian military drone near the border. Algeria said the aircraft entered its territory; Mali denies it. The relationship had already soured after Bamako abandoned the 2015 Algiers-mediated peace agreement and accused Algeria of maintaining ties to northern rebels, a claim Algeria denies.

This is a tactical de-escalation, not a resolution. Algeria remains wary of Russian influence expanding near its southern border, and Mali still suspects Algerian contacts with Tuareg groups could undermine its push to control the north.

What this means

Anéfis is a tactical win for Bamako, not a decisive turn in the war. Expect renewed rebel and jihadist attacks on supply routes, isolated outposts and convoys in the near term. The bigger question is whether the AES, backed by expanding Russian support, is actually consolidating into a functioning regional military system or just coordinating on individual battles.

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