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After a couple of weeks to rework our website and introduce a paid tier, Center of Gravity is back. Thank you to all our loyal subscribers, we hope you enjoy the new CoG experience. Consider signing up for our paid tier. For the price of a cup of coffee, you’ll get not only ad-free daily CoG updates, but also in-depth analytical assessments on issues of geopolitical significance. Moving onto the global geopolitical situation… it remains deeply unstable… and as always, we recommend that you view everything through the lens of the steadily increasing U.S. - China competition. The 17 June U.S.-Iran Versailles memorandum is holding only nominally, with Hormuz now both battlefield and bargaining chip ahead of Doha talks. - Since 25 June, Iranian attacks on commercial shipping have triggered U.S. strikes on Iranian missile, drone, radar, surveillance, air-defense and minelayer assets, while Iran has broadened pressure on Bahrain and Kuwait. - Oil markets have recovered only partly, as shipping delays and infrastructure damage threaten a slow normalization. - The nuclear and sanctions tracks remain deadlocked over inspections and frozen-asset use. - Lebanon is the most important secondary pressure point: a U.S.-brokered Israel-Lebanon framework demands full disarmament of non-state armed groups, but Hezbollah and Speaker Nabih Berri have rejected it as Israel continues strikes. - In Iraq, a major anti-corruption sweep tied to the oil sector has detained officials, lawmakers and political figures, testing whether Baghdad is pursuing reform or factional politics. - In the Asia-Pacific, Australia has secured Vanuatu against foreign basing, while Japan-South Korea defense ties are deepening as China applies economic pressure. - Notably, Pakistan-Afghanistan tensions have risen again after Pakistani strikes along the border yesterday. |
Center of Gravity
What you need to know
Ceasefire holds in name, fractures in practice
The June 17 Versailles memorandum between the U.S. and Iran is no longer functioning as designed. Both sides are using military pressure as leverage ahead of Tuesday's Doha talks, making this an armed negotiating pause rather than a genuine ceasefire.
The memo committed Iran to "best efforts" on Hormuz passage but left routes, enforcement, fees, and third-party roles undefined.
That ambiguity is now the central dispute.
Hormuz becomes the battlefield and the bargaining chip
Iran and the U.S. have exchanged strikes four times since June 25, each triggered by attacks on commercial shipping. The U.S. is targeting Iranian military infrastructure; Iran is broadening its response to include regional U.S. partners.
June 25: Iran struck the Singapore-flagged M/V Ever Lovely exiting Hormuz near the Omani coast.
June 26: U.S. CENTCOM hit Iranian missile, drone storage, and coastal radar sites.
June 27: Iran struck the Panama-flagged M/T Kiku, carrying over 2 million barrels of crude.
June 27 follow-up: U.S. aircraft destroyed Iranian surveillance, communications, air defense, drone storage, and minelayer assets.
Iran then launched attacks toward U.S.-linked targets in Bahrain and Kuwait.
Kuwait intercepted two ballistic missiles.
Bahrain reported drone damage, no deaths.
No U.S. casualties confirmed.
Oil markets rattled despite partial recovery
Prices rose Monday after renewed strikes slowed energy flows through Hormuz, reversing earlier signs of recovery. Even a stable ceasefire may not quickly normalize supply.
Analysts warn that shipping backlogs, infrastructure damage, and production disruptions will delay full supply recovery regardless of the ceasefire's status.
Nuclear and sanctions tracks remain deadlocked
The memorandum deferred all hard nuclear questions to a 60-day negotiating window, and the two sides are already in open disagreement over what was agreed.
Washington says Iran accepted long-term IAEA inspections. Tehran denies agreeing on those terms.
The U.S. says released frozen assets must be restricted to food and medicine. Iran insists it controls how the funds are used.
Lebanon complicates the picture
The memo references ending hostilities "on all fronts, including in Lebanon," but a parallel U.S.-brokered Israel-Lebanon security framework is running on a separate track that Hezbollah and Iran reject (see below).
What to watch
Continued managed de-escalation is the most likely near-term path, but the risk of miscalculation is high on multiple fronts simultaneously.
A successful strike on a commercial vessel or U.S. forces in the Gulf would be the clearest trigger for full re-escalation.
Stabilization indicators to watch: unimpeded vessel movement through Hormuz and a functioning U.S.-IRGC deconfliction channel.
Doha talks on Tuesday are the next critical test of whether both sides are ready for negotiations.
U.S.-brokered Lebanon deal faces rejection before implementation
The security framework signed in Washington on Friday, June 26, between Israel and Lebanon is already under severe political pressure, with Hezbollah declaring it null and void, Speaker Nabih Berri calling it impossible to implement, and Israel conducting strikes that suggest the agreement does not constrain its operational reach. The Lebanese army is now positioned between Israel's security demands and a domestic opposition with both street power and institutional representation.
The deal goes further than previous formulas. Rather than focusing solely on Hezbollah's presence south of the Litani River, it demands the complete and verified disarmament of all non-state armed groups across Lebanon, a provision that Hezbollah, Amal, and resistance-aligned actors view as an existential demand rather than a negotiating position.
Israel continues striking while the ink dries
Israel has conducted multiple operations since signing the framework, signaling that the agreement does not limit its freedom of action. The strikes are politically significant because they give Hezbollah grounds to argue the deal is a cover for continued Israeli military operations rather than a genuine security arrangement.
Friday, June 26 (day of signing): Israel killed seven Hezbollah members near Israeli-occupied positions in southern Lebanon and dropped warning leaflets over Mansouri inside the security zone.
Saturday, June 27: An Israeli drone struck Nabatieh al-Fawqa, reportedly outside the mapped security zone, killing one person and wounding others.
Sunday, June 28: Israel destroyed a Hezbollah tunnel in Majdal Zoun, informing the U.S. in advance.
Tunnel dimensions: over 200 meters [656 feet] long, more than 25 meters [82 feet] deep, containing weapons and launch shafts.
Israel also struck Hezbollah fighters armed with RPGs and hit a rocket launcher in the Nabatieh area, with additional drone activity reported over Baalbek.
Hezbollah and Berri harden into open rejection
Hezbollah Secretary-General Naim Qassem has declared the framework null and void, framing it as unilateral concessions to Israel. The group's core objection is sequencing: Israel insists on disarmament before withdrawal; Hezbollah insists on Israeli withdrawal before any weapons discussion. Hezbollah MP Hassan Fadlallah has warned that any Lebanese army attempt to enforce disarmament could push the country toward internal conflict.
Berri's shift is the more consequential institutional indicator. He moved from conditional support to full rejection by Sunday night, describing the framework as contradictory and incompatible with Arab League commitments. By Monday morning, June 29, Amal formally labeled it an "agreement of dictates" that would not pass in its current form.
Hezbollah supporters take the dispute to the streets
Protests erupted in Beirut and the Bekaa from Friday night onward, with motorcycle convoys moving through central Beirut and the airport road. At least one major route was blocked with burning tires, including the old airport road in Beirut's southern suburbs, before Lebanese army troops dispersed protesters and restored access.
The Riyaq-Baalbek international road was cut at the al-Jabali roundabout in Douris on Saturday, June 27, blocked in both directions before the army arrived and reopened it.
"Lebanon First" billboards placed along the airport highway after earlier pro-Iran posters were removed were subsequently burned or defaced, with at least one replaced with Hezbollah's formula: "Army, People, Resistance."
The Lebanese army warned Saturday evening it would not tolerate road closures or damage to public and private property.
Judging progress
The framework's survival depends on whether the Lebanese army can enter and secure the first pilot zones without triggering a broader domestic confrontation. Two near-term triggers could collapse it entirely: further Israeli strikes outside the agreed security zone, which would validate Hezbollah's framing of the deal as a blank check for Israeli operations, or Hezbollah escalating from street protests to armed response.
The pilot zone sequencing is the first concrete test, as no deployment has begun and no disarmament timeline has been publicly defined.
Berri's institutional weight as Speaker gives the opposition a veto point inside the Lebanese state, albeit in the legislature, not the executive.
Washington's stated intent to tie future assistance to verified implementation progress means U.S. leverage is real but also slow-acting against an immediate street and political crisis.
Known Unknowns: The impact of U.S. tariffs on international trade & especially the U.S. bond market. Whether U.S./Israel war on Iran will return to high intensity operations. What impact this war will have on the global economy. Relations of new Syrian government with Israel, international community & ability to maintain stability inside Syria. China’s triggers for military action against Taiwan. U.S. and allied responses to China’s ‘grey zone’ warfare in the South China Sea and north Asia. Ukraine’s ability to withstand Russia’s war of attrition. The potential for the jihadist insurgency in Africa’s Sahel region to consolidate and spread.
The Middle East
Birthplace of civilization
Iraq's anti-corruption sweep targets oil sector & political class
Iraqi authorities launched a large-scale anti-corruption operation late Saturday, June 27, arresting at least 47 officials, lawmakers, and political figures by Monday morning. The operation is directly linked to the ongoing investigation into former Deputy Oil Minister for Refining Affairs Adnan al-Jumaili, arrested May 30, whose statements during interrogation appear to have generated the current wave of warrants.
The sweep is notable both for its scale and its targets. Those publicly named include sitting and former parliamentarians, senior advisors, state institution figures, and a serving deputy minister, suggesting the investigation has moved well beyond al-Jumaili himself.
Green Zone sealed, raids spread across Baghdad and four provinces
The Counter-Terrorism Service led the operation, supported by army units and armored vehicles, with Green Zone entrances sealed in the early hours of Sunday as forces moved on residences and government-linked compounds.
Raids were conducted across multiple Baghdad districts and four provinces.
Baghdad districts: Yarmouk, Qadisiya, Shaab, Sadr City, Zayouna.
Provinces: Maysan, Babil, Diyala, Salahuddin.
Also raided: The Midlands Oil Company headquarters south of Baghdad.
Oil ministry at the center of the corruption allegations
The al-Jumaili investigation has already produced major asset seizures, pointing to systemic extraction from Iraq's oil sector rather than isolated misconduct. The inclusion of Deputy Oil Minister for Distribution Affairs Ali Maarij al-Bahadly (who was sanctioned by the U.S. in May) among the named detainees demonstrates that the probe now spans both major refining and distribution arms of the ministry.
Reported seizures case include hundreds of millions in cash, property, gold, weapons, and ammunition.
Charges across the broader group cover encroachment on public funds, illicit gain, misuse of state resources, exploitation of influence, and improper benefits from government contracts or commissions.
Fifteen names publicly circulated, full list still withheld
Iraqi authorities have not released a complete warrant or detainee list. The 15 publicly named individuals include Muthanna al-Samarrai, Mohammed al-Karbouli, Ziyad al-Janabi, Mudhar al-Karawi, Hind al-Abbasi, Mohammed Farman al-Jubouri, Bushra al-Qaisi, Bahaa al-Nouri, Alia Nusaif, Hassan al-Khafaji, Mohammed Jameel al-Mayahi, Abdul-Rahman al-Luwaizi, Mohammed al-Sayhood, Ibrahim al-Sumaidaie, and Ali Maarij al-Bahadly.
Current situation
Several suspects vacated their residences before forces arrived, prompting tighter checks at Baghdad International Airport and broader follow-on searches still underway as of Monday. Authorities describe the campaign as ongoing, meaning the detainee count and the political exposure are likely to grow.
Cold War 2.0
It’s the U.S. vs China, everyone has to pick a side
Australia locks in Vanuatu as China competition for Pacific intensifies
Australia signed the Nakamal Agreement with Vanuatu on June 29, securing preferred partner status on security and policing and a binding commitment against foreign military basing on Vanuatu soil. The deal closes a vulnerability Canberra has been working to address since China began deepening its economic and security footprint across the Pacific.
The agreement's infrastructure consultation clause is the most significant strategic tool. It requires Vanuatu to consult Australia before allowing third-party investment in critical infrastructure, giving Canberra a formal early-warning and influence mechanism over Chinese-linked projects in a country where Beijing is already the largest external creditor.
Three commitments define the deal's strategic weight
The Nakamal Agreement is structured around interlocking obligations that collectively limit Vanuatu's room to accommodate rival security partners. No single clause works alone; together they create a framework that would make Chinese military or security access to Vanuatu significantly harder to operationalize.
Australia becomes Vanuatu's preferred security and policing partner.
Vanuatu commits not to host foreign military bases or militarized infrastructure.
Vanuatu must consult Australia before approving third-party investment in critical infrastructure.
A$500 million over ten years backs the commitment
Canberra had already pledged A$500 million [approximately $323 million] over ten years as the financial underpinning of the agreement. That figure is substantial relative to Vanuatu's economy (the World Bank put the 2024 GDP at $1.12bn) and shows that Australia is prepared to compete economically, not just diplomatically, to hold its Pacific position.
Durability
The agreement's durability will depend on whether Australian funding and engagement outpaces Chinese creditor leverage over time. Vanuatu's debt exposure to Beijing gives China a structural tool to test Vanuatu's compliance with the infrastructure consultation clause, particularly on projects framed as development rather than security-relevant.
The infrastructure consultation mechanism has no publicly reported enforcement or arbitration process, making its practical effect contingent on Vanuatu's political will to apply it.
Any Chinese-linked port, communications, or energy project in Vanuatu will be an early test of whether the clause functions as intended.
Japan-S. Korea defense ties deepen, China raises economic pressure
Japanese and South Korean defense ministers met in Seoul on June 28, agreeing to revive joint search-and-rescue drills and reaffirming commitment to Korean Peninsula denuclearization.
The meeting is part of a U.S.-encouraged rapprochement that is accelerating faster than domestic political conditions in either country would normally allow, driven by a shared threat environment rather than resolved historical grievances.
The bilateral improvement remains structurally fragile. Territorial disputes and historical sensitivities over military cooperation have not been settled; the security environment is simply outpacing them.
China responds to Japan's defense posture with supply-chain pressure
One day after the Seoul meeting, on June 29, Beijing added 20 Japanese entities to its dual-use export control list and placed another 20 on a watchlist, explicitly citing Japan's remilitarization and its position on Taiwan. China's commerce ministry described the measures as limited and non-disruptive to ordinary trade, but the targeting is pointed.
Named entities include Japan's Institute for Defense Studies and subsidiaries or affiliates linked to Mitsubishi, Komatsu, and Fujitsu.
The move follows an established Chinese pattern of using export controls and supply-chain restrictions as political signaling tools against governments that challenge its positions on security, technology, or Taiwan.
Tokyo's defense build-up is the direct trigger
Japan has steadily increased defense spending, deepened security cooperation with the U.S. and regional partners, and taken a more explicit stance on Taiwan Strait stability. Beijing frames those moves as participation in a containment strategy; Tokyo frames them as a necessary response to China's growing military activity. The export control list is Beijing's current answer to that disagreement.
South China Sea gray-zone pressure continues in parallel
Earlier in June, the Philippines took diplomatic action over a small Chinese-linked floating structure near Scarborough Shoal, reportedly measuring approximately 6 by 6 meters [roughly 20 by 20 feet] and fitted with an antenna. The structure later disappeared from imagery, but Manila continues to treat the episode as part of China's broader gray-zone campaign around the shoal.
The South China Sea remains an active pressure front even as the Taiwan Strait is assessed as the more dangerous potential flashpoint.
The dynamics
The three developments, tightening Japan-South Korea defense cooperation, Chinese economic retaliation against Japanese entities, and continued South China Sea gray-zone activity, reflect a consistent regional dynamic: U.S. allies are consolidating security ties while China uses a layered toolkit of maritime, administrative, and economic tools to push back. The question is whether Chinese economic pressure accelerates or complicates Japanese and South Korean domestic consensus for deeper military cooperation.
Watchlist
Pakistan strikes Afghan border territory, Taliban rejects accusations
Pakistan conducted ground and air operations along the Afghan border on June 28, killing at least 29 individuals it identified as militants linked to Jamaat-ul-Ahrar, a faction responsible for attacks inside Pakistan. Islamabad framed the strikes as a defensive response to recent terrorist incidents and accused militants of using Afghan soil as a sanctuary.
The Afghan Taliban rejected Pakistan's account entirely, claiming the strikes killed dozens of civilians rather than combatants and accusing Islamabad of violating Afghan sovereignty. The competing narratives are irreconcilable and follow a well-established pattern since the Taliban's return to power in 2021.
A structural dispute with no resolution mechanism
The core disagreement between Islamabad and Kabul has not changed: Pakistan holds the Taliban responsible for allowing Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan and affiliated groups to operate from Afghan territory; the Taliban denies harboring militants and treats cross-border Pakistani operations as sovereignty violations. Neither side has a functional bilateral mechanism to resolve the dispute, and the Taliban has shown no willingness to act against groups Islamabad designates as threats.
The June 28 operation is unlikely to be the last. Pakistan has conducted cross-border strikes before without producing a durable reduction in militant activity, and each incident further degrades an already minimal level of bilateral trust. The risk is less a conventional escalation than a gradual hardening of positions that closes off any remaining diplomatic space.
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What happened today:
1236 - Ferdinand III of Castile captures Córdoba. 1520 - Moctezuma II dies during the Spanish conquest of Tenochtitlan. 1880 - France annexes Tahiti. 1881 - Muhammad Ahmad declares himself the Mahdi in Sudan. 1913 - Bulgaria attacks Serbian positions, triggering the Second Balkan War. 1950 - Harry S. Truman authorizes a sea blockade of Korea. 1970 - U.S. ground forces withdraw from Cambodia. 2014 - The Islamic State declares a caliphate in Iraq and Syria.
